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In November 1975, a group of sailors led by the ship's
political officer took over the Soviet "Krivak" class destroyer
"Storozhevoy" and attempted to sail to Sweden to seek asylum.
They were attacked and turned back by Soviet naval and air
units. Information of this dramatic event which has never
been acknowledged by the Soviets, made it to the West only
piece by piece. It was the intent of this study to assemble
all available data for critical analysis to determine potential
causes and implications.
This mutiny is not the only instance of dissent in the
Soviet Navy nor will it be the last. Problems of alcoholism,
officer-enlisted relations, food, hazing, habitability
,
desertion, ethnic friction and unhappiness over constant
political indoctrination appear to be widespread.
The key question is: how important are these instances
of dissent and how do we incorporate them into a framework
for assessing Soviet military capability and performance?
In the past we have overemphasized quantitative aspects
of assessing military and naval power. The factors which are
less quantifiable such as "fighting spirit", unit cohesion
and morale have made a greater difference historically. In
the allocation of scarce resources for defense and other
national priorities
,
i t is essential to make intuitive

estimates of potential enemy capabilities as accurately as
possible. In the case of the Soviet Navy, even planning for
the worst case, it seems defense planners still have over-
estimated some of their strengths. The Soviet Navy has grown
from a coastal defense force to a blue-water fleet capable
of greater influence on the seas. They are not, however,
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I. INTRODUCTION
How is military power measured? In the V/est, generally,
attempts to measure are done by numerically tabulating forces
of various sorts: the numbers of men under arms, the number
of weapons of a given type, etc. This is itself an evasion
of the problem of estimating the more significant factors of
military power, since it says nothing about the actual capa-
bilities of the forces of one country to deal with another.
These numerical counts of men and weapons do not include
geographical constraints, natural resources, potential mili-
tary capability and most importantly, the command style and
will or fighting spirit of the soldiers or sailors of the
respective nations. If one looks at battles in history,
people and their nonquantif iable capabilities have been more
important in battle than numbers or equipment capability. In
World War II, German General Erich von Manstein was willing
to accept an adverse one-to-nine ratio in division units when
fighting the Soviets on the Eastern Front. He knew his forces
were that much better.
This case study will focus on one dramatic incident which
occurred in the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The author, in final
analysis, will attempt to show that the Soviet Navy is not as
overpowering as the numbers of ships and similar quantifiable
factors would indicate. The ships may be bristling with

armament above decks while dissent is brewing below decks.
This study attempts to assemble the facts about the mutiny
and discuss the important aftermath for the crew and the
vessel. The Soviet reaction or evidence of the reaction will
be investigated through a number of Soviet public pronounce-
ments. This study will cite a number of causes which could
have led to the mutiny. In addition it will examine causes
and effects of morale problems in general in the Soviet Armed
Forces and specifically the Soviet Navy.
To assess the implications of this event and morale
problems, one must focus on how military power and combat
capability are most commonly measured. One must then generate
an intuitive framework to include human factors in some sort
of capability measure. This study, therefore, points to the
conclusion that since the navy of the Soviet Union has
extended itself to an active position in all the oceans and
seas of the world, the personnel problems which may have been
thought to be insignificant have been exacerbated and brought
to the forefront. The Soviet Naval High Command has to
realize that some scarce resources are going to have to be
spent to improve morale, because Soviet weaknesses are becoming
evident to the West. The Western military planners are
beginning to realize that personnel problems may be the most
important Soviet vulnerability that can be exploited.

II. DATA SOURCES
Assembling a study such as this is not without diffi-
culties. Getting information out of the Soviet Union on
military matters is always difficult and even more so about
an event such as a mutiny. The Soviets have made a deliberate
attempt to keep the mutiny a secret.
The research is based solely on secondary sources: either
interviews by the author or press accounts of the mutiny.
The author also interviewed two journalists who had researched
the event and received a great deal of analysis and specu-
lation from sources considered to be experts in Soviet Naval
Affairs. As is the case with dramatic acts of violence whose
accounts are prone to exaggeration, there was a great deal
of conflicting data. The author many times had to choose one
source over another as being more valid. Speculation, which
is noted as such in the paper, was used to fill in the gaps
between facts. The study presents the first compilation of
facts, speculation, and analysis about an event which is
important to Western military planners.
The author placed advertisements in three U.S. based
emigre newspapers. They were Novoye Russkoye Slovo
, Russ ian
Life Daily and Laiks (the Latvian emigre newspaper) . The
advertisement stated: "Graduate scholar looking for persons
who have served in the Soviet Navy since 1970 or those persons
10

who have any knowledge concerning the mutiny that occurred
aboard a naval vessel in Riga in 1975." Five persons re-
sponded to the advertisement. Four chose to remain anonymous.
The five are numbered 106 through 110 in the list of references
All were interviewed over the telephone; each interview taking
at least an hour. The author has no knowledge about the
reliability of the telephone interviewee's information and
if the respondants are in fact who they claim they are except
that their information was confirmed by other research. This
author understands the problem of using information from
emigre'' sources ; that is using sources who have left the Soviet
Union and are emotionally biased against the Soviet regime.
In this case and in connection with general morale in the
Soviet Navy, the author attempted to separate the facts from
opinion.
Three human sources were particularly important to this
research. Each had done some investigation into the mutiny
on the Storozhevoy, but had not assembled enough information
on his o\\m. These people -- Alex Milits, a Swedish journalist,
Mikhail Bernstam, a Soviet dissident now at the Hoover
Institution and David Satter, the Moscow correspondent for
the London-based Financial Times -- provided essential data.
The compilation of information from these three sources, as
well as the author's research, provided the facts necessary




On the seventh of November 1975, the 58th anniversary of
the Russian Revolution was being celebrated throughout the
Soviet Union. To join in the celebration in the port city
of Riga, capitol of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
the destroyer "Storozhevoy" of the "Krivak" class had moved
from its homeport of Bolderia to a pier in Riga 15 kilometers
up the Daugava River. She was moored on the east banks of
the Daugava (the Russian, rather than Latvian name, is
Zapadnaya Dvina) at the customs pier. This area is near the
center of this city of 650,000 people, near governmental
buildings and near the narrow winding street of "old Riga."
The ship had been open for tours by local citizens all day
(see map Appendix C) . Approximately one half of the
Storozhevoy ' s crew of 250 men had been given shore leave to
join in the anniversary festivities.
The Storozhevoy was one of then fifty-seven major surface
combatants in the Soviet "Twice Honored Red Banner Baltic
Fleet." Bolderia was smaller than the major fleet bases at
Leningrad, Kaliningrad (Fleet Headquarters), Liyepaya and
Talinn, but still supported a few destroyers, escorts, and
diesel submarines [65],
The Krivak class first appeared in 1970, a product of
the Baltysk shipyard near Kaliningrad. With 400 feet of
12

length and 3800 tons displacement, the Storozhevoy and her
sister ships are handsome ships designed for both speed and
seakeeping. Eight sets of gas turbines provide her with
112,000 pounds of shaft horsepower. An impressive assortment
of armaments lines the decks. She has two twin 76mm guns aft,
two twin 30mm guns and two quadmount torpedo launchers amid-
ships. For air defense, the Krivak class has two SAN-4
surface-to-air missile launchers. Up front, she displays a
quadlauncher for the SSN-14 anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
rocket-assisted depth bomb [53:155], (See photo and diagram
Appendix D) . The Soviets referred to the Krivak class as a
"large ASW ship" (Bolshoi Protivolodocny Korabl) in 1975, but
in 1977 redesignated it a patrol ship [31:115]. The Storozhevoy
was one of six Krivaks in the Baltic fleet in 1975. The class
now numbers twenty-six and more are still being built.
The Zampolit (political officer) of the Storozhevoy, a
Captain Third Rank (Lieutenant Commander) by the name of
Valery Mikhaylovich Sablin, had stayed aboard ship rather
than venture into Riga with a number of his fellow officers.
He had a great deal of planning to do.
The job of Zampolit is a descendant of the Pre-World War
II political commissar. He is no longer of equal rank to the
ship's commanding officer, but is subordinate to him. He
does, however, have a completely separate chain-of -command
within the military political directorate (GLAVPUR) headed
by General Yepishev. Much has been done to improve the
13

traditional reputation of the Zampolit as the shipboard
"informer." He now functions like a combined personnel
officer, chaplain, and welfare and recreation officer in
addition to removing the majority of the burden of political
education from the other officers [48:20].
The old political commissars were drawn from the civilian
populace directly and thus did not mesh well with the other
members of the shipboard wardroom. The Zampolit of today on
the other hand is frequently recruited from armed forces
personnel who have shown promise as Communist Party activists.
At a special school in Kiev, the prospective political officer
not only receives extensive schooling for his primary mission
of political enlightenment, but is also trained to fulfill
a military function in his future unit as well. In a major
combatant ship like Storozhevoy, the Zampolit is the third
in command following the CO and his senior assistant (Starpom)
and is required to qualify as an underway watch officer [48:20]
The Zampolit thus sits in the unique position of being
the one person to whom all sailors are encouraged to take
their welfare problems, like an ombudsman, but still can
command the ship and extract respect from the sailors. If
he is sensitive to their problems and not just a "party hack"
or informer, he is the one officer who could establish some
sort of rapport with the sailors.
Other junior officers may have an interest in their sub-
ordinates, but do not have time to develop this interest due
14

to other responsibilities. Junior officers are not only the
shipboard managers and military leaders but also the main
technical specialists of their respective departments. They
must supervise and often perform the major maintenance and
repair functions. They still carry some burden of political
work; they are the backbone of "socialist" competitions and
fulfill their own responsibilities as candidate party members.
Fully 80% of all Soviet officers are party or Komosomol
members [11:114]. The Navy figure is 9S'6 [22:54].
It is evident that Sablin, despite his upperclass up-
bringing, was able to establish a special rapport with the
enlisted sailors. He was the son of a Soviet Colonel and had
grown up a privileged member of Soviet society [99]. Sablin
was born in Gorky in 1939. He was a descendant of the
Decembrist M. S. Bestuzhev, who took part in the 1825 revolt
against Czar Nicolas the First [60] .
The twice weekly, two hour political lessons of Marxist-
Lenninist theories aboard the Storozhevov must have degenerated
into the mere monotone reading of Pravda editorials, which
the sailors looked upon as incursions into their very little
free time. This was followed by the ratings expressing their
dissatisfaction with food, living conditions, extra duties,
limited leave and other usual sailor complaints. The unusual
thing was that Sablin probably agreed with them rather than
exhort the standard party line. One such meeting was taking
15

place with those remaining onboard the ship that afternoon
in November 1975 [99].
The Storozhevoy had been very busy since its commissioning
in early 1974. On the third of October 1974 the Soviet news-
paper Izvestiva reported the arrival of a three ship Soviet
Naval contingent in Rostock, German Democratic Republic (East
Germany) for a five day visit. The Storozhevoy, the cruiser
Sverdlov, and the destroyer Obraztsvoy were there to join in
the celebration of the East German twenty-fifth anniversary.
Vice Admiral V.V. Mikhaylin, Commander of the Baltic Fleet,
led the group [82:2].
The Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, sailed
onboard and "evaluated" highly the mastery of the anti-
submariners in their firing of ASW missiles (either SSN-14 or
RBU) . He stated that the Storozhevoy "had all the requirements
necessary to win first place in Socialist competition among
outstanding ships." [35:211] This show must have been a
"Potemkin Village" put on for the Defense Minister because on
the 24th of December 1974 an article appeared at the top of
page two of the Soviet military newspaper Krasnaya Zvesda
(Red Star) which was very critical of the Storozhevoy by name.
It cited the Grechko visit and went on to say that Storozhevoy
had finished the training year in October 1974 very poorly. »
The article criticized the discipline onboard and some
"comrades" were accused of lapses on "the ethical" front and
"taking up the liberal position in the fight for purity of
16

the heart." [62] This jargon is usually translated to mean
the officers were not very good at maintaining discipline and
moreover were not particularly interested in being good party
members
.
The article compares the two gun batteries of Senior
Lieutenants Dubov and Kolomnikov, saying that the subdivision
of the former was always successful in competition where the
latter lagged continuously behind. Kolomnikov was excused
due to his youth and inexperience and lack of guidance he was
given by the Communist Party organization of the ship.
The article went further to criticize the party organization
on the ship mentioning party members Firsov, Sazhin, Potulny
and finally Sablin for their inability to explain the ship's
problems. The news account ended with the standard exhortation
to do better and for the communists to "carry their party
cards next to their hearts." [62] (See Appendix A for entire
text of the Krasnaya Zvesda article.)
Only six days prior to this article the Storozhevoy had
been mentioned in a positive light in another Krasnaya Zvesda
article. She had participated in a coordinated ASW exercise
with aircraft and submarines. The article praised the
tactical competency of the commanding officer and praised
the subunits of Captain Lieutenant Ivanov and Senior Lieutenant
Vinogradov for "seizing the combat initiative." They were
given an outstanding grade [86:2]. It is unknown if this is
the same exercise that was discussed six days later. A later

article in Krasnaya Zvesda in early 1975 related another
successful ASW exercise by the Storozhevoy but gave no
indications that the ship had overcome her problems or would
be classed with other outstanding ships [35:212] .
The Storozhevoy had spent a great deal of 1975 at sea
underway. Most notable was her participation in the "Okean"
exercise of 16-27 April 1975. The Storozhevoy was one of 220
ships that participated. It joined in the Soviet show of
force in the Atlantic and thus spent a good deal of time away
from its Baltic homeport. In the December 1975 issue of the
West German journal Marine Runschau , the Storozhevoy was cited
as a participant in a Baltic live missile exercise which
included seven cruisers, two other destroyers and a number of
OSA class patrol boats. The exercise took place in mid-
October 1975.
At the shipboard meeting of certain crew members that
afternoon of November 7, 1975, those Petty Officers and con-
scripts whom Sablin had been selecting and molding for months
must have joined him in a crucial decision. They would lock
the other officers in their cabins below decks that night and
would sail to the Swedish island of Gotland and seek political
asylum. At an average speed of 33 knots the journey of 17 5
nautical miles through the Irben Sound from Riga to freedom
could take no more than five and one half hours.
Sablin was counting on the fact that the holiday would
give them a head start. In addition, they counted on the
18

other officers sleeping more soundly than usual due to their




At approximately 0200 hours on the eighth of November,
the Storozhevoy slipped quietly from her berth in Riga to
begin a dash across Riga Gulf. Course was set for the Irben
Channel at the mouth of the Gulf between the Osel and the
Courland Peninsula (See map Appendix B) . It will probably
never be known how many of the crew were loyal to Sablin and
the other conspirators. Although gas turbine powered, the
Krivak class is considerably less automated than the later
American gas turbine powered "Spruance" class and would thus
require a greater number of persons to man the engine room
and the bridge. In addition, line handlers and persons in
navigation and auxiliary spaces would be required. It would
be possible to speculate that Sablin with one other known
officer participant named Markov and a loyal following of a
dozen petty officers, were able to order the remaining skeleton
crew of unwary 18 and 19 year old conscripted sailors into
manning their respective stations with tales of a national or
naval emergency.
Storozhevoy means "watchful" or "on guard" and the ship
and crew were being just that. The mutineers were sailing
with lights out at 30 knots which is still short of the vessel's




Available evidence is not completely clear on how the
alarm was actually sounded or what convinced the Baltic
authorities that a mutiny was in progress. The harbormaster
reported the ship's departure probably within about 30 minutes
in accordance with standard regulations.
A single conscript not loyal to Sablin's cause jumped
overboard before the ship reached the mouth of the Daugava
River and the Gulf of Riga. This man caught his breath by
clinging to a channel marker buoy before swimming to the west
bank of the river. His attempt to inform Soviet authorities
of the mutiny in progress was reported by two different
accounts in the Soviet underground press, the Samizdat [111:2].
The sailor, cold and ;vet from his swim, first tried to
flag down the few cars running at 5 A.M. No one stopped
assuming he was just another sailor drunk from over-celebrating
the holiday. Public transportation was not running due to
the holiday. The young conscript finally reached a public
phone and called the duty officer at the Bolderia Naval Base
outside of Riga [104]. The sailor said he had something very
important to say that he could not disclose over the phone.
He asked the duty officer to send a car to pick him up. The
duty officer refused again fearing another drunken sailor in
the midst of a telephone prank. The sailor ended up making
the distance to the Naval Headquarters on foot, thus giving
the Storozhevoy a little over a two-hour headstart [111:2].
Disbelievers at the Riga Naval Headquarters attempted contact
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but received only silence in return. Still there was no
vigorous reaction by Rear Admiral I.I. Verenkin, Commander
of Riga Naval area, to call in Moscow. It was only when the
amazing message, "Mutiny onboard the Storozhevoy; we are
heading for open sea" was received on an emergency frequency,
that the Naval High Command and Soviet Defense Council, in-
cluding Fleet Admiral Gorshkov (Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet Navy) were awakened and notified [66:65]. Chaos erupted
at Naval Headquarters. The message was evidently sent by an
officer who had surreptitiously freed himself and made his
way to a radio undetected, although a conspirator who had
changed his mind could have sent it. This particular message
and all radio traffic that followed were received uncoded and
in clear Russian by the Swedish Armed Forces.
Tivo naval reconnaissance aircraft were ordered off immed-
iately on a locating mission from the Skirotava airfield on
the Southeastern outskirts of Riga. Nine other Baltic fleet
ships were also dispatched in the chase including another of
the Krivak class, and a patrol boat from Riga [80].
Four hours had elapsed since their departure from Riga.
Storozhevoy ' s new leaders were optimistic; the previous
radio contact and the conscript who had jumped overboard were
unknoivn to them. They had passed the Irben Sound and were
out of the 12 nautical mile limit of the Soviet territorial
waters into the Baltic Sea when the first of the now 10 air-
craft in pursuit found them. Half the aircraft were "Bears"
22

from the Soviet Naval Air arm, and half were fighter-bombers
from the Soviet Air Force. By all appearances, the pilots
had been ordered not to sink the valuable ship if at all
possible. From the air the ship was ordered to "lie dead in
the water" and promises of non-punishment and pardons for
their crimes if they would return to the Soviet Union were
given over the radio, but Storozhevoy did not alter course
or respond [52:13]
.
The order was given to attack, but some planes sent to
quell the mutiny initially refused. The Swedes recorded
"very stormy conversations" which revealed reluctance by the
pilots to bomb their naval comrades. The planes eventually
carried out the order, except for one who declined to take
part and returned to base still carrying his ordnance [78].
The first shots were fired across the bow and then bombs
were dropped to a circle still trying to avoid damaging the
destroyer. No response came from the Storozhevoy. It remains
unclear to this author whether it lacked the men and know-
ledge to man the anti-aircraft weapons, or the crew simply
chose not to do so, feeling that to return the fire would be
suicide. One source said that all the ammunition was secured
and thus those involved in the rebellion were unable to get
to it. Another source stated that Sablin gave orders that
"no one was to suffer at their hands". [111:3] He did not
want them to commit any violence in their quest to escape.

Evidence of the utter chaos and disarray is clear. As
the Storozhevoy began evasive maneuvers to avoid the attacking
aircraft, the pursuing Naval Forces closed the gap. The lead
ship in this group, the sister ship of the Krivak class, came
under attack by mistake in the early dawn light. Rockets hit
on the deck and the bridge area of the pursuing ship. In
the aftermath, this ship received more damage than the
Storozhevoy. This ship was seen by many Latvian sources being
repaired in Riga immediately following the incident [75:2].
On board the Storozhevoy the rudder had been hit making
control difficult. Certainly by now those conscripts who
had been unaware that a mutiny had occurred aboard were aware
something w^s amiss. Also, borderline conspirators must have
felt now that they had no chance of success at this point.
Sablin and the few remaining zealots no longer had the numbers
necessary to continue. The mutiny ended meekly and by 0800
the Storozhevoy had surrendered and been boarded by naval men
from ships which had reached their position. She lay dead in
the water only 30 nautical miles from Gotland [80].
The first ships to reach Storozhevoy were not those dis-
patched from Riga, but patrol ships and escorts which had
come from Liyepaya. The boarding parties met no resistance;
on the contrary they were met with appropriate salutes and
normal military courtesies as if nothing had happened [111:2].
Sablin himself was on the bridge. He had received a minor
wound in the bombardment. None of the crew members who had
24

been locked up were injured. The Captain's hands were
bloodied either from trying to force his way out or from
his attempts to signal his predicament to others [104].
An emigre interviewed by this author who was on the staff
of Krasnaya Zvesda in the Baltic Military District at that
time heard through his superiors about the event. He stated
that the crew of the Storozhevoy was removed on the spot and
taken to Riga. The numbers of killed and wounded vary
dramatically in the press but this same source stated that
his superiors told him that the killed and wounded on the
Storozhevoy were "less than fifteen" but thirty-five received
the same fate on the accidentally attacked sister ship [108].
The Storozhevoy itself was towed to Liyepaya, a Latvian
city on the Baltic for repairs. Being a closed city, (Soviet
citizens may not even visit there without special permission)
Liyepaya provided the Soviets with the necessary security to
accomplish the minor repairs in secret [104].

V. AFTERMATH
Shortly after the drama, a Krivak class destroyer in
perfect condition bearing the Storozhevoy ' s number made a
conspicuous cruise along the Soviet Baltic Coast participating
in a number of official celebrations in order to quell the
rumors and accounts that had begun to emanate from that area
[75:2]. It is of course possible that it was another ship
where name and number had been switched. The Storozhevoy
had appeared with different numbers prior to the mutiny --
both 203 and 626. Having different numbers, which was a
common practice in the Soviet Navy at that time, has been
stopped lately. Many Western analysts feel that in order to
instill more pride in crew members, the Soviets now paint the
ship's name prominently on the stern. Changing numbers randomly,
therefore, would no longer confuse western intelligence.
On the twelfth of November 1975, articles in the Swedish
press appeared saying that the wreck of a Soviet target ship
was found abandoned in Swedish territorial waters off of
Gotlund. The Soviets apologized shortly thereafter and re-
trieved the hulk saying it had been used for target practice
on the eighth of November in the Baltic and had drifted aivay.
A fisherman from Gotlund was quoted as saying that it did not
appear in the waters off Gotlund until the eleventh of November.
At this time very few people knew anything about the attempted
26

mutiny. The connection was not made until a few years later
that the Soviets deliberately set the target ship adrift there
to provide an explanation to anyone who had monitored the
event [104 ].
On the eleventh of April 1976 with a new crew, Storozhevoy
sailed from the Baltic with a Ropoucha class LST and an oiler,
passed through the Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal, entering
the Indian Ocean on the twenty-fifth of April [34:208]. The
Storozhevoy operated there for t\\fo months before transiting
first to Vladivostok then on to Petroparlovsk where it is now
homeported with the Kamchatka Flotilla of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet. Like many Soviet dissidents before, the Storozhevoy
was banished to Siberia. It appears that the continued pre-
sence of the ship in the Baltic would only fuel the mutiny
accounts that were then circulating. The Storozhevoy has been
photographed by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft from Okinawa
wearing a distinguished citation award that had not been
present before the mutiny. It is not known if the citation
award is a result of the mutiny. "Dentology" of these photos
revealed no trace of any damage from the attack. The number
was again changed and in 1980 Storozhevoy bore the number
682 [103].
The fate of the conspirators and the rest of the crew is
not nearly so clear. Military discipline in the Soviet Navy
is much more stringent than in the U.S. Naval Service. Great
stress is put on "exactingness" which means a detailed devotion

to all military rules and regulations. In the case of mutiny,
however, U.S. and Soviet Naval regulations parallel- -the
death penalty is prescribed.
In general, one facet of Soviet military justice, to
ensure compliance with regulations, is to make an example of
offenders. When a Soviet sailor is inducted, he recites a
military oath of strict obedience and states that should he
break his vow, he should be subject "to the severe punishment
of Soviet law and the general hatred and contempt of the
workers." [42:52] To see that this hatred comes about, Soviet
military journals and newspapers often run stories of male-
factors complete with actual names and units. It is assumed
that such public humiliation will induce the guilty person
to see his errors and prevent others from similar conduct.
In the case of the Storozhevoy, the potential for national
humiliation or evidence of military weakness overrode the need
to make an example of the conspirators. The mutiny, the
resulting trial, and punishment have been kept a fairly well-
guarded secret.
On the morning of the ninth of November, Sablin and some
of his co-conspirators appeared before the procurator (pros-
secutor) of the Court of the Baltic Military District in Riga
as required by Soviet law. Due to the nature and severity of
the crime they were flown to Moscow later that day and in-
terned at the GAPTVAK (short-term military prison) of the
Moscow Military District [99].
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The Chief procurator from Moscow, Anatoli Rudenko, arrived
within a week to lead the investigation [74]. Initially the
investigation consisted of routine discussions at all levels
of the Baltic Fleet by commanders, political officers and
representatives of Yepishev's political staff from Moscow.
Once this was complete however, the order was issued that no
information or any responses concerning the mutiny would be
released. All discussion was to cease. Not even closed
letters from one local party central committee to another
would mention the Storozhevoy ' s attempt to flee [111:3].
The trial of 15 of the mutineers, including Sablin, took
place in May of 1976 before the Military Division of the
Supreme Court of the USSR [99]. Because of the nature of the
crime and the potential for capital punishment the two lower
courts, the Military Tribunal of the Baltic Fleet and the
Military Tribunal of the Navy, were bypassed. Under normal
circumstances less severe crimes committed by Communist party
members or political officers are tried outside the military
system by Party Commissioners at each level [17:155].
Captain Third Rank V. M. Sablin was given the death penalty
and the sentence was carried out by a firing squad soon after
the 5-day trial. On the eve of the execution, Sablin' s father
was granted a 'twentv minute meeting with his son. The meeting
took place in the presence of a large group of KGB officials.
Sablin and his father were permitted to talk on "personal




Sablin's family did not escape the wrath of the Soviet
regime. One of his brothers, who worked on the General Staff,
was transferred to eastern Siberia. Another, who was a
teacher in an institution in Moscow, was moved east to Ivanovo
[60].
The second mutinous officer was, sentenced to 15 years in
a labor camp. The fate of the enlisted conspirators is
unknown, but one less reliable source stated that overall 82
crew members were executed [68]. This very high figure is
possible due to the fact that no primary source for the mutiny
has come forward in the following six years and that the
suppression of information concerning the mutineers has been
so successful. This author is still inclined to believe the
number executed was considerably less because far more sources
have testified to fewer resulting deaths. The remainder of
the crew, including the Captain, were dispersed to various
locations throughout the Soviet Navy. Underground sources
stated that even these officers who did not participate in





The Soviet government has yet to admit that a mutiny ever
took place aboard the Storozhevoy, and it is doubtful at this
point that it ever will. The only official pronouncement on
the mutiny, a denial, was made by Vice Admiral V. V. Sidorov,
First Deputy Commander of the Baltic Fleet, at a press con-
ference on 10 August 1976 in Copenhagen, Denmark. The Admiral
was there commanding a five day diplomatic port call of two
older Soviet naval vessels; a Kotlin class destroyer "Nastoy-
chivy" and a Mirka class Corvette. Sidorov in reply to the
question of mutiny stated:
Mutiny on a Soviet Naval Ship in the Baltic- -unthinkable I
It must be a hoax played by organs established for this
purpose which pursue their thwarting aims in the West.
Stories of that sort, which appear in the Western i\/orld,
can only invite ridicule among us. We do not believe
we even have to comment on that sort of thing [89].
Despite not admitting to the mutiny explicitly, the Soviets
have, by the change in the content of certain public pro-
nouncements, all but acknowledge it occurred. Soviet
Communist Party Secretary General Brezhnev at the 25th Party
Congress in February 1976 discussed military leadership
specifically in sophisticated terms. Military leadership
had not been mentioned by Brezhnev in his address to the 24th
Congress nor was it mentioned at his most recent speech before
the 26th Congress. He pointed out that:
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The modern leader must combine within himself the
party-mindedness and profound competence, discipline
and initiative, and he must take a creative approach
to matters. At the same time, on any issue the
leader is obligated to take account of the socio-
political and educational aspects, to be tactful
toward people and their needs and aspirations, and
to set an example at work and in his daily life
[34:211] .
Admiral Gorshkov referred to these comments in his Navy
Day interview, "these high party demands apply in full to
commanders of ships, units and formations." These words
suggest that the time has come in the Soviet Armed Forces,
and the Navy in particular, when a commander must understand
and relate to his men and not just follow orders and perform
"by the book" as has been traditionally preached.
In an article in Krasnaya Zvesda on 11 February 1976,
Gorshkov discussed shortcomings in the work of some Party
organizations in the Soviet Fleets and criticized the level
of efficiency attained by engineering officers. He stated:
Ship commanders and Party organizations had to pay
particular attention to the ideological education of
junior officers. We must study in greater depth, and
seek to influence the formation of the ideological
and moral potential of the future commander's person-
ality, weighing up strictly whether the officer is
ready to be a military leader in the era of the
scientific- technical revolution, to be genuine inno-
vator, whether he is capable of taking firm,
scientifically-based decisions from party and state
positions [54:16]
.
The Admiral, in the past, had very seldom mentioned disci
pline in such specific terms, especially in terms of the
"ideological commitment" of some of the officers. Such
criticisms were either avoided or left for comment by lesser
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officials. These comments and many others reflect the
frequently recurring themes in professional Naval writings
of discipline or ideological fervor in the time immediately
following the mutiny. (Such comments increased after the
flight of Victor Belenko in September 1976.)
In the February 1976 edition of Morskoy Sbornik (the
Soviet Naval Digest) , Admiral Gorshkov again stressed the
importance of command emphasizing discipline. This February
issue iN^ould probably be the first one appearing whose content
could have been affected due to the mutiny, given the 50-56
days of preparation for each issue (Typesetting and printing
dates are given in each issue) [38:535]. This author per-
formed a content analysis of Morskoy Sbornik from the January
1975 issue through the January 1977 issue to determine if the
percentage of articles dealing with the topics of political
indoctrination, political training or military discipline had
increased from the year prior to the mutiny to the year
following the mutiny. The January issue was eliminated from
the comparison for two reasons. First, since the 25th
Communist Party Congress was convening the next month, there
was an unusually high number of politically related articles
(eight of thirty-five). Second, with minor fluctuations in
the printing dates, the January issue could have been written
either before or after the mutiny. Thus, the comparison of
post-mutiny articles began with the February 1976 issue. The
resulting analysis shows a 5 percent increase (from 11 percent
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to 16 percent) in articles dealing with discipline, morale
and political indoctrination. Certainly there are myriad
other factors which could have influenced this increase of
political articles but the fact that there was an increase
points towards evidence of the mutiny. (See Appendix F)
In the research for this study, translations of the Soviet
military and civilian press, as well as the Soviet Naval
Digest and other military journals, were searched for refer-
ences to the Storozhevoy. Although this search was certainly
not exhaustive, it is still important to note that five
articles mentioning this ship were found in the two years
prior to the mutiny and none were found in the seven years
following the event.
Late in 1978, the Soviet Navy promulgated new shipboard
regulations. This was the first major overhaul of these
regulations since 1959 although minor revisions occurred in
1967. The new regulations added two new shipboard departments
to cope with the advancing technology of the fleet, but more
importantly, the regulations increased the role of the com-
manding officer in political indoctrination. The revised
shipboard regulations "place emphasis on the duties of the
commanding officers to direct the work of the political
apparatus toward successful accomplishment of tasks assigned
to the ship, and to strengthening the military discipline
and increasing the political morale of personnel." [26] The
new revised regulations place greater responsibility on the
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ship's commanding officer for the overall direction of poli-
tical work, including more supervision of the Zampolit. It
i\/ould seem that the ability of the ship's political officer
to be a rival to this commanding officer's authority has been
greatly reduced under the new regulations. Commanding officers
are expected now to increase readiness and combat capability
by supervising a thorough political and ideological indoctri-
nation of their crew, both officers and enlisted men. The
new regulations continue to exhort the need for "exactingness"
in performance of duties on now longer voyages and thereby
develop a more harmonious shipboard "collective."
The most dramatic Soviet reaction to the mutiny was the
leadership shake-up which occurred in the Baltic Fleet immedi-
ately following the incident. Admiral Vladmir Vasilyevich
Mikhaylin was relieved as commander of the Baltic Fleet
within three weeks of the mutiny [34:209]. He had served
that post since 1968, having served as First Deputy Commander
of the Baltic Fleet for the four years prior to that [12:78],
Mikhaylin was moved to Moscow to be Deputy Commander-in-Chief
for Maval Educational Establishments. According to William
Manthorpe, former U.S. Naval Attache to the Soviet Union,
this job is not befitting a former fleet commander [105].
He had been awarded the Order of the October Revolution on
the occasion of his sixtieth birthday in July 1975. Mikhaylin'
s
departure certainly was not in line with the timing of the
normal Soviet Navy practice of serving as First Deputy
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Commander before moving up to Fleet Commander because
Mikhaylin's First Deputy, Vice-Admiral V.V. Sidorov (mentioned
earlier), had been on the job only a few months and could not
be promoted [41:101]. Mikhaylin was therefore replaced by
the Baltic Fleet Chief -of -Staff Vice-Admiral Anatoliy
Mikhaylovich Kosov, who had served in that capacity since
1972.
The Baltic Fleet Political Directorate Chief escaped the
purge. Vice-Admiral Nikolay Ivanovich Shabilikov has served
in that position from 1972 until the present time. The
Commander of the Riga Naval Base, Rear Admiral I.I. Verenkin
must have been thought to be too new to receive any of the
blame. He arrived at that post in May 1975, six months before
the attempted mutiny [41:299].
It would certainly seem that if the blame for this event
had to be placed anywhere outside of the mutineers, it be-
longed with the Political Directorates of tlie Baltic Fleet
and of the Navy. The fact that Sliabilikov remained in office,
given the fact that the mutiny was led by a political officer,
sheds an interesting light on the power balance between the
political Directorate and the Naval High Command.
B. SWEDISH REACTIONS
The events in Sweden after the mutiny are especially
pertinent since a great deal of what is knovm about the
mutiny originated there. The majority of what occurred from
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the time the Storozhevoy departed the Gulf of Riga until the
ship surrendered was monitored by the Swedes on either radio
or the radar of Swedish Patrol aircraft. The Swedes did not,
however, reveal publicly what they had monitored. The first
press account of the mutiny appeared on the 23rd of January
1976 in the Stockholm Daily, Expressen , and carried the byline
of Alex Milits, journalist of Estonion origin living in Sweden.
The majority of other news accounts used quotations from this
report or from later accounts Milits would write. How he
came upon the story and how it later unfolded to some degree
are important to mention.
In late November 1975 Milits was visited by a Latvian
emigre who had just returned from a visit to Riga. The emigre
asked, "Why has no one xvritten anything about the mutiny that
occurred in Riga?" The emigre then said that six different
people had talked about the mutiny while he was in Riga. He
had been told that it was a large ship, "possibly a destroyer
or cruiser". [104]
Being unwilling to x\^rite about such an important event
with only one source, Milits visited the port area in Stockholm
and inquired among Soviet merchant sailors from various Baltic
ports including Riga. Most had not been home for some time
and knew nothing of an alleged mutiny. A few sailors promised
to inquire about the mutiny and contact Milits when they
returned to Stockholm [104]. One week later, Alex Milits
received a phone call. A Russian voice asked if he were the
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one inquiring about the mutiny. The caller sounded very
nervous and refused to give his name. He told Milits that
he had just returned from Riga and had seen a naval vessel
damaged by bombing. This damaged vessel, the caller said,
had participated in the chase for the mutinous ship. When
asked by Milits what sort of ship had tried to escape, the
caller replied in Russian, "Storozhevoy . " He then suddenly
hung up [104 ].
Milits admits he misunderstood the size of the ship in-
volved in the mutiny at this time. The Russian words
"Storozhevoy korabl" referred to a small coastal escort ship.
He therefore thought the mutiny had occurred aboard that type
of ship rather than the much larger Krivak class ship named
Storozhevoy. It was i\/ith this information that he published
the first account in Expressen of a mutiny on a Soviet
escort ship.
Four days later Milits was called by another seaman who
had been read the article in the paper by a Swedish shopkeeper
The sailor told him he was in error. The mutiny took place
on a destroyer. The Russian also told him to read a certain
issue of Krasnaya Zvesda . He also hurriedly hung up stating
that "someone was coming." The issue he was referring to
was the December 24, 1974 issue that was cited earlier in
this study. With the information provided in that article,
Milits found that research became easier and through inter-
views with tourists, Lithuanian fishermen, and merchant
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sailors, he published a much more accurate account in
Expressen in May of 197 6 [104].
Other newspapers in competition for the story and any
information about the mutiny found information hard to obtain.
In retrospect it is evident they often used less than reliable
sources and produced wildly exaggerated accounts. The Daily
Telegraph of London reported that the Storozhevoy actually
reached Sweden, but was denied asylum by the Swedish Govern-
ment. The report said sailors jumped overboard and were
machine-gunned in the water by Soviet aircraft while the
Political Officer and five co-conspirators committed suicide
aboard [76]. The Latvian Information Bulletin quite under-
standably reported the crew was a majority of Latvian nationals
and the mutiny was part of a larger nationalist uprising in
Riga.
The Swedish Military High Command initially said nothing
about what they knew concerning the mutiny but wlien reporters
began their inquiries in February, they did very little to
dispell the rumors. Reporters who questioned the High Command
about the incident received only a very diplomatic response:
"...the command staff confirms that during routine monitoring
of radio traffic in this time frame activity that deviated
from the norm was noted." [75:2] The spol<:esman "absolutely"
declined, however, to confirm that the Soviet radio traffic
had pointed to a mutiny. "On the other hand, neither could
he deny this supposition." [71] This author feels from the
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research, that the Swedes made a concerted effort to get the
actual information distributed, off the record, to various
journalists. The Swedes' reluctance to make an official state-
ment could be explained by their sensitive neutral position
or the need to protect intelligence collection capabilities.
The most important reason, however, was not made public until
September of 1976 when a leftist Swedish fortnightly journal
Folket i Bild-Kulturfront accused the former Swedish Defense
Minister, Sven Anderson, of paying a one million dollar bribe
to U.S. Air Force General Rocky Triantaf ellu, head of Air
Force Intelligence, over the period of 1970-1973 [104]. The
Swedish military ivas forced to explain that the four $250,000
payments were not a bribe but a perfectly legitimate business
transaction to purchase electronic equipment used to listen
to Soviet Bloc military communication traffic. Sweden's
Baltic neighbors and some domestic public opinion were horri-
fied over the disclosure of the classified deal with the
Pentagon, since it was too naked a breach of Swedish neutrality
[58]. Stig Synnergren, the Commander of the Swedish Armed
Forces, confirmed at a press conference that the equipment
had been used to monitor messages sent by Moscow to Soviet
bombers pursuing a runaway Soviet frigate. He acknowledged
that the money laundered through commercial banks, came from
a secret Defense Ministry fund [88].
Captain Thomas Wheeler, USN, \vho x\'as tlie Naval Attache
in Sweden at that time stated that Swedish government officials
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with whom he had spoken were actually very glad that the
Storozhevoy did not reach Sweden and that they were not faced
with the question of granting asylum to the mutineers. The
officials stated that they had always granted asylum on an
individual basis to Soviet defectors but mutiny, a serious
crime in any Navy, in the face of Soviet pressure was a
potentially different matter. In light of Swedish reaction
to the Soviet submarine which ran aground near the Karlskrona
Naval Base in October 1981, it appears the Swedes have taken
a tougher stand against Soviet pressure.
C. U.S. REACTIONS
The American reaction was even more muted than the Swedish
one. Again, Captain Wheeler told of several State Department
messages i>^hich instructed U.S. Embassy personnel to "keep the
lid" on the incident [105]. The explanation for this is
probably found in the fact that the U.S. was still attempting
to maintain some sort of detente with the Soviets and did not
wish to embarrass them on the international scene.
A second possible explanation was that the U.S. needed to
protect its own intelligence capabilities. This, however,
is refuted in that U.S. intelligence personnel have said that
"the incident was over before we knew what was happening" and
"we had nothing focused to gather any information." So, it
appears the U.S. Government, like the press, was at the mercy
of the Swedes for accurate information.
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Another possible explanation is that at the time of this
incident the Ford/Kissinger Administration was locked in
battle with Congress to appropriate funds to support the
FNLA/UNITA factions in the Angolan Civil War. The Soviets
and their Cuban proxies were heavily supporting the MPLA
faction. The administration certainly would not have wanted
to amplify or confirm an event which might show weakness in
the Soviet military machine at a time when they are trying
to get funds to oppose it.
The only semi-official U.S. Government statement at all
was by Representative Larry McDonald (D., Georgia) who, on
June 9, 1976 after being told the same exaggerated information
cited earlier, offered a resolution condemning Sweden for
their refusal to grant asvlum to the crew of the Storozhevov
[27:12]. The U.S. Government historically has not commented
on instances such as this mutiny and with the lack of concrete
data at the highest levels and the aforesighted reasons, the




Until one of Storozhevoy ' s ex-crew members is allowed
to speak, the world will probably never know the actual cause
of the mutiny. There are, however, a number of potential
factors which must have contributed to the reason for the
few crew members to try such a desperate act.
The most significant possible explanation will not be
covered in this study. The dissatisfaction in general with
the Soviet government and life under its totalitarian rule
has been written about in countless books. As an explanation
for dissent, such dissatisfaction must be implicit in any
work about the Soviet Union. In addition, a number of causes
that will be cited pertain to problems in all of the Soviet
society. This study focuses on those causes only as they
relate to the Soviet Armed Forces or more specifically the
Soviet Mavy.
A. .-XNGOLAN CIVIL WAR
Until the U.S. Congress refused support for the opposition
factions in the Angolan Civil War on December 9, 1975, the
Soviets certainly feared that this West African conflict
could spread into a superpower confrontation. Their Naval
build-up in the area attests to this fact. The Soviets also
cancelled all Navy leaves at this time. Finally, those con-
scripts who were due to muster out of the Navy in early
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autumn of 197 5 were extended indefinitely. Normally the old
ones would depart once they trained their replacement. (This
would apply to one-sixth of the conscripts onboard the
Storozhevoy, since they serve a 3-year tour of duty and are
released only twice a year--in the Spring and Fall.) [53:58]
One sailor on another ship was quoted as saying: "What do
we have to do with the fact that some black apes in Africa
want to cut each other's throats? \'Je ivant to go home!" [104]
7\ny military man in any country would agree that to hold any
sailor past his obligated service, when a national emergency
is not apparent, is grounds for potential dissent.
3. ETHNIC CONFLICT
A second potential cause is the nationalities issue. This
factor has received considerable attention lately with the
increase in Central Asian population in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Navy, however, takes only eight percent of the
men conscripted annually and can thus be selective [93:60].
Along with the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy gets the
cream-of - the-crop . It is estimated that Slavic nationalities
comprise over 90 percent of the enlisted ranks and virtually
all of the officer corps [98]. Ethnic friction is an admitted
fact of Soviet military life in the army, but Soviet authori-
ties admit that the Armed Forces are their best instrument




It would seem that at first glance those who cited
Latvian nationalism as a potential cause for the mutiny
should be discounted. The Soviet policy of "extraterritoriality"
means preventing any Baltic conscripts or other minorities
from being stationed in their homeland [54:10]. In addition,
since Baltic peoples are generally considered "less than
reliable," they would probably not serve in the Navy at all
but in construction battalions in Siberia [11:107]. Inter-
views conducted by this author indicate in fact that tliere
are sailors of the Baltic nationalities serving in the Baltic
fleet. One former sailor who served in Talinn said that
anyone with any connections or money can get his son to
serve out his conscripted time close to home. He said this
was especially common in Latvia and Estonia [106]. Russians
historically have had a continental focus and have not been
the greatest sailors, where the Baltic peoples, Latvians
included, possess the skills from a very long fishing and
seafaring tradition. In addition, the Baltic nationalities
are highly educated and technically-oriented. These two
factors make them ideal for Naval service and thus a nationalist
cause for the mutiny does exist for those still chafing over
Latvian incorporation in the USSR.
Some of the press reports said that disaffected Jev'/s led
the mutiny [73:4]. This is not likely due to the fact that
Jews at this time could emigrate relatively easily. Why
should they risk their lives to do it? The opposite effect
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may be more important. The relative ease with which Jews
could emigrate could have added to the frustration that non-
Jewish Russian sailors felt in not being able to do so, thus
forcing them to more violent measures.
The Russian military is regarded by many Baltic peoples
as an occupation force. Fights between Baltic citizens and
Russian servicemen stationed in the Baltic states are often
reported [106]. This kind of atmosphere cannot be conducive
to good morale among Soviet sailors.
There are over 100 different nationalities in the Soviet
Union. The Navy, as stated, takes only a few minorities but
they do exist. Central Asian peoples are found in many
assignments, but in small numbers and usually in lower ranks.
Jews are more common in the medical and technical fields and
serve in the fleet in both the officer and enlisted capacity.
The ivlaval reserve in the Baltic area is comprised primarily
of Baltic peoples, but the commanders are still Russian. Few
minorities get advanced assignment and even fewer become
officers [93:27]. One sailor interviewed said he never saw
an officer of any other nationality otlier than Russian,
Belorussian or Ukrainian [106].
The race-concious Russians have been successful at their
attempts to "colonize" the non-Russian nations. Russian
migration throughout the country has ensured domination by
the Russians in key leadership positions. This "Russif ication"
has caused considerable resentment in many minorities
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particularly Baltic people. Baits, thus are often thought
to be security risks. On one occasion, the Estonians on the
crew of a Kresta 1 class cruiser were removed prior to a
cruise to the Mediterranean [107].
Ethnic frictions exist, but they are something that has
to be dealt with in the multi-national Soviet society. These
frictions tend to be less in the Navy than in the other
services due to the closeness of shipboard life.
C. LIVING CONDITIONS
Morale problems associated with harsh living conditions
can be particularly significant for naval personnel. The
habitability of Soviet ships is substantially lower than that
of corresponding Western vessels. Reports of poor conditions
are substantiated by Western observers after visiting Soviet
ships. Soviet ships are much more heavily armed than Western
units of similar tonnage, and that has to be accomplished at
the expense of the crew's comfort.
There is a great deal of difference between conditions
on older ships and those recently built. Soviets have
realized that living conditions, especially on the now more
common longer voyages, have a great effect on morale. The
greatest change is air-conditioning in the crew's quarters
since more and more cruises are going to tropical climates.
The overall impression one receives when visiting a
Soviet ship is that it is far from luxurious, cramped, drab
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but clean. On the older "Kotlin" class the berthing spaces
are dimly lit and crowded. (Although one source said
"crowded makes for better cooperation") . [107] Bunks are
three-tiered with a 2 foot by 2 foot non-lockable box for
each sailor. The spaces are not air-conditioned although
space air-conditioners are carried on voyages to the tropical
climates [107]. There are no water fountains in the living
areas. Drinking water is available from a portable metal
barrel with a community drinking cup [106]. On older ships,
food is carried from the central galley and consumed in
berthing spaces [35:212].
In contrast the Smolnyy, a Soviet midshipman training
ship that was put into service in 1976, is centrally air-
conditioned. It has a comfortably furnished officer's mess,
and three dining rooms for the enlisted. The Smolnyy, in
addition, has a "Lenin room" in which political instruction
is given, which accommodates forty men. The ship also has
facilities for movie projection and a 6,000 book library [52].
Visitors aboard the helicopter carrier Moskva described
their impressions as: limited space, spartan living con-
ditions, rudimentary equipment and one unusual condition-
-
the presence of Russian girls (nurses) in their white uniforms
It seems nurses are not uncommon on the largest ships. The
all pervasive smell aboard Moskva was described as "a mixture
of cabbage soup, bacon fat, and that black, slightly rancid
typically Russian tobacco." [2]
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The Northern Fleet sailor who served on the Kresta I
class ship "Admiral Drozd" described major morale problems
in association with Soviet Naval inability to get mail to
ships on long cruises distant to the Soviet Union [107].
This was in 1970. It is unknown if this situation is any
better today.
The Navy exists ashore as well as afloat and accommodations
on land appear to be worse than those at sea, particularly
in such inhospitable areas such as Polyarnyy in the Arctic,
Vladivostok or Petropar lovsk. Victor Belenko, at a MIG-25
base in the maritime provinces of the Russian Far East, lived
in a two room apartment just prior to his defection. With
him were his wife, a flight engineer, the engineer's ivife
and their two children. They considered themselves lucky.
Other apartments were packed with three and four families [5:97]
The Soviets, it seems, are aware of these problems and
write about them, but according to Belenko and others, do
not give it the priority it deserves. In Krasnaya Zvesda
in 1974, Rear Admiral N. Sidorchuk (Chief of the Fleet Rear
Services) discussed the housing situation for Navy men in the
Pacific Fleet in fairly frank terms. He stated:
...the Party and the government are showing consistent
concern with regard to improving the housing and
living conditions for service families . . . In the Pacific
Fleet in the last three years alone, thousands of
families have received new living quarters. There
is a problem of maintenance, however. In isolated
far-off garrisons there is often a lack of trained
maintenance specialists .... In some areas house
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maintenance committees exist solely on paper and
actually do nothing. This had resulted in problems
which can affect the serviceman in the performance
of his regular duties [72].
Housing for servicemen in other areas of the Soviet Union
is better but not iv^ithout problems. Members of the military,
particularly officers, are given priority on the list to
receive new housing in urban areas where a shortage exists.
Victor Belenko, as a newly reported aviation instructor in
the Western Soviet Union, related his excitement over getting
a new apartment in a building only one month old:
To be promised an apartment was one thing, but to be
given an apartment as promised, quite another.
Eagerly and expectantly, I unlocked the door and
smelled dampness. The floor, built ivith green lumber,
already was warped and wavy. Plaster was peeling off
the walls. The windowpane in the kitchen was broken
and no water poured from the faucet. The bath tub
leaked; the toilet did not flush. None of the electri-
cal outlets worked. . . .Another lieutenant and I con-
fronted the first party representative we could find,
a young political officer in the same building. He
was cynical yet truthful. The building had not been
inspected as they had been told. The military
builders sold substantial quantities of alotted
materials on the black market, then bribed the chair-
man of the acceptance commission and took the whole
commission to dinner. There the acceptance papers were
drunkenly signed without any commission member ever
having been inside the building [5:79].
The Krivak class, of which the Storozhevoy is a member,
possesses the same shipboard habitability problems as other
Soviet combattants. It is cramped and spartan. Morale prob-
lems due to the poor habitability would therefore be under-
standable. Those Storozhevoy sailors living ashore in
barracks or with their families were not faced with the grim
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conditions that existed in the Soviet far east. Riga is a
large and relatively modern Soviet city. Housing is still
scarce, however, and newer housing has quality problems due
to corruption in the construction industry. Living conditions
should be considered as a probable cause for the mutiny.
D. FOOD
In the Soviet Union where military power is so extremely
important you might expect the consumers to suffer somewhat
so that the military soldier and sailor might eat very well.
It seems that this is not the case. Food certainly could be
a cause of low morale, but how bad can the food be? Sailors
in every navy complain about the food. In the Soviet Union
food consumption has doubled from 1950-1974 [50:74], but it
appears there are still a large number of problems in getting
adequate food to the sailors.
The Soviets, in their regulations, appear to be very
concerned that the troops in the military are well fed.
Rations are provided free of charge to all soldiers, sailors,
cadets and reserves when on active duty. Soviet authorities
often boast about their ability to provide the troops with
adequate rations. It is also official policy to see that
elite forces receive better food than regular line forces
[15:51].
Officers, if they serve in the elite Strategic Roclcet
Forces, receive free rations. Pilots receive four meals a
SI

day, also free. Sailors and flying personnel receive 4,692
calories per day where soldiers receive only 3,547 [47:81].
Officers who serve in certain isolated regions of the USSR
or abroad either get free rations or pay only half the cost.
Strangely enough, officers who serve above the altitude of
3,500 meters get free rations as ivell.
Servicemen abroad get a tobacco ration. Nonsmokers may
opt for 700 grams of sugar instead. Within the USSR, soldiers,
sailors and cadets get eighty kopeks a month for tobacco
[47:81].
The Soviet regulations do not specify anything concerning
the quality of the food. An average daily menu paints a
somewhat different picture. Soldiers are fed breakfast from
0730 to 0800. The morning meal generally consists of a bowl
of kasha (a barley or oat mush cooked with flour) with 150
grams of bread, 10 grams of butter, 20 grams of sugar and a
mug of tea [5 : 97 ]
.
Lunch is the main meal. Soldiers and sailors are given
forty minutes to eat followed by thirty minutes rest. Lunch
consists of a thin potato or cabbage soup, sometimes
thickened with buckwheat groats. If they get any meat at all
during the day it will be included in this soup; eitlier a
piece of cod, herring or a hunk of pork fatback. On special
occasions, a mug of kissel (a kind of starchy gelatin) will
be added along with more bread [40:46].
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In the thirty minutes alotted for supper, servicemen
are served many times the same meal of kasha and bread they
had for breakfast. If they get any fresh vegetables it will
be at this meal in the form of cooked cabbage or mashed
potatoes [106]. Finally, they receive more bread. A Soviet
serviceman consumes an average of one and a half pounds of
bread per day [40:46]. Primarily due to this excess starch,
he manages to gain six to eight pounds during his con-
scripted service. In the West, the average weight gain for
young men in the age period of 18-20 years is almost double
that.
Servicemen can try to supplement their diet at their
unit's "bufet" (snack bar), but a conscript's salary of 5-5
rubles per month (approximately four dollars) , cannot really
buy too many of the cookies and candies sold there [90:9].
Thereby, only those sailors who receive money from home and
can buy other food on the civilian economy are able to eat
any better.
It appears in terms of calorie intake, the diet is suf-
ficient. It is, however, dull and without certain essential
vitamins. A former sailor interviewed by this author stated
"It filled you up but made you feel sluggish all day." [106]
The conditions under which servicemen are forced to eat
do not add to the enjoyment of their food. Victor Belenko





Between 180 and 200 men were jammed into barracks
marginally adequate for 40. Comparable congestion in
the mess hall made cleanliness impossible, and the
place smelled like a garbage pit. While one section
of 40 men ate, another 40 stood behind them waiting
to take their places and plates. If they chose, they
could wait in line to dip the used plate in a pan of
cold water containing no soap. Usually they elected
simply to brush the plate off with their hands and
sit down due to the short time for eating [5:99].
In the Navy, as mentioned earlier, there is no general
crew's mess aboard the older Soviet ships. The food prepared
in the galley is carried to the crev/'s berthing spaces to be
consumed. This is not only cramped and unsanitary, but
dangerous since fires due to heating elements have been re-
ported [35:212]. When the heat below deck becomes intolerable
sailors eat on deck on oilcloths with no tables or chairs
[97:85]
.
Former members of both the Army and Navv agreed that food
in the Navy was better in both quantity and quality. In
addition. Navy personnel stated despite how bad tlieir food
was, they were fed better than the civilians in the surrounding
communities. Naval personnel received some meat almost every
day. In addition, tliey were the only ones to respond that
they received coffee.
The army infantry and construction troops receive the
worst rations of all. A Soviet army unit subsisted on kasha
and codfish alone for thirty days without any variety [14:32].
Complaints about food often follows ethnic lines. The only
meat one array unit ever received was pork, something Moslem
Central Asians refused to eat [14:39].
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There is some evidence that Soviet soldiers in the field
often suffer from various illnesses related to vitamin de-
ficiencies. One soldier who was stationed with an air defense
battery near Murmansk reported that troops in his unit often
developed sores and skin ulcers, sometimes accompanied by eye
infections and night blindness [15:52]. These and other
illnesses, such as severe acne, rapid tooth decay and chronic
sore throats, all of which plague Soviet soldiers, are trace-
able in many instances to vitamin deficiencies. In some
areas troops were given vitamin pills to supplement their
diet, but one soldier testified that they were not taken in
his unit under the suspicion that they contained saltpeter!
[15:52]
Fresh fruit is unheard of in the Soviet Armed Forces. A
sailor who served on a cruiser out of Murmansk never saw fresh
fruit in his three years of conscripted service [107].
Soldiers' feelings about food are very strong. A former
private who, during his service in the early seventies was
quartered for some time near a military installation in an
area where servicemen from other Warsaw Pact countries were
training, said in reference to the Warsaw Pact allies:
They had an excellent mess. Soldiers from our bat-
talion were twice sent on kitchen duty to their
messes. They came back bringing pancakes! They
brought sour cream! My friends were among them, so
they brought some to me. It seemed like a miracle.
We remembered it to the end of our service [90:9].
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Dissatisfaction of soldiers with food has led to open
protest, usually refusal to eat. A former paratrooper told
how, after a year of particularly bad harvest, each soldier's
ration of butter, bread and sugar was reduced. The soldiers
after a brief organizational meeting, refused to eat. Half
an hour later the division political officer appeared and
ordered rations increased to their old levels. They were
never reduced again and no one was punished for his
disobedience [90:9].
In interviews with former soldiers, Dr. Robert Bathurst
reported that a majority feel that their food situation is
worsened by dishonesty on the part of the NCO ' s responsible
for the galley. In addition, senior conscripts often extort
food from junior conscripts as part of a general policy of
hazing (discussed at length in the next section) which is
overlooked by senior enlisted personnel and officers. The
fact that everyone steals food, particularly meat, is widely
recognized and accepted.
It must be stated that the Soviet soldier is quite accurate
when he complains about the quality of food available to him.
Even with the low standards of Soviet society, the majority
of soldiers in the regular units believe that food is worse
than that found in civilian life. Military rations are
monotonous, poorly prepared and inadequate in terms of vitamin
content. Although the number of calories appears sufficient
due to the high starch content, it still does not appear to
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be a diet adequate enough to sustain a young man through the
rigorous Soviet military day.
When one looks, however, at how this impacts the combat
ability of Soviet soldiers and sailors one must be careful to
look at it with a Russian mindset. Certainly if volunteer
American soldiers were fed in the same fashion as conscripted
Soviet troops, an open revolt would occur. Many Russian
peasants have eaten boring, untasty food all their lives and
their short stay in the military is little different.
It is the style of every soldier in the world to complain
about his food, but the Soviet Union might be the place where
the serviceman has a real reason to do so. It is said that
"an army moves on its stomach," if so, the Soviet military is
not going very far. Today's relatively more urban, well-
educated Soviet draftee is apparently less willing to accept
the material hardships of military life. Moreover none of
the current conscripts have had first-hand experience of the
trying years of World War II, an experience which is viewed
by the Soviet leadership as an important source of Soviet
patriotism.
The author has no testimony concerning the quality or
quantity of food onboard the Storozhevoy. One can only infer
that it was very similar to that in the rest of the Soviet
navy. Poor food can therefore be cited as one potential
cause of the mutinv.

E. FIAZING
One of the characteristics o£ Russian society is its
harsh stratification. This stratification is carried over
into the military service. Russians subordinate themselves,
at least on the surface, to those above them in the hierarchy.
They also tend to distrust and abuse those below them on that
same ladder. In the Soviet military this is translated into
"hazing." Second and third-year conscripts have long
enjoyed seniority over younger draftees, claiming special
privileges with the unit and channeling the undesirable
duties to the new men. Emigre sources indicate that moderate
hazing is accepted by the conscripts and tolerated by officers
and petty officers because it provides a convenient way of
maintaining unit control. Excessive hazing, however, can
lead to low morale of the younger draftees and less solidarity
of the unit as a whole.
The soldiers and sailors are generally divided into two
groups: the "young ones" (Molodye) and the "old men" (Stariki)
[90:4]. The former are the conscripts in their first year
of service and the latter are those in their second of final
year of service.
Before the 1967 Law of Universal Military Service reduced
the length of time served in all Soviet land forces from three
to two years, there had been an intermediate group in their
second year of military service. This group of course is




The "Stariki" rate a number o£ privileges at the expense
of the "Salaga" (a derisive nickname for first-year sailors)
[107], When new conscripts arrive at their unit, one of the
first orders of business is the uniform exchange. The "old
men" exchange their worn uniforms for the new ones of the
young first-year conscripts. The "Stariki" generally want
to return home after demobilization in brand new uniforms
[106]. A sailor who served on the minesweepers in the Baltic
Fleet sold the new uniforms to Central Asian army troops who
found it more prestigious to go home in a navy uniform [106].
All of the heavy work and menial chores such as cleaning
and kitchen work are done by the "Molodye." A source in a
Riga signal battalion had to shine boots for the second-year
men (He was a shore-based sailor and thus only served two
years) . First-year sailors in his unit had to give up parts
of their ration of sugar and butter to the "Stariki." The
"old men" also demand a share of each food parcel or money
gift received from home by the "young ones." [110]
This system does not appear to meet with a great deal of
resistance. The conscripts are probably away from home for
the first time at age eighteen and giving one "old man" what
he wants without any fuss seems to provide the new conscript
with protection from tlie other "old men." Another explanation
for the passive acceptance of this hazing is that in the two
or three years of arduous military life, most of tlie
conscripts become considerably stronger, particularly in the
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army. The threat of physical harm is often used as inducement
for compliance. A recent study emphasized that attempts were
being made to reduce physical violence used by the "old men"
against the new recruits [90:5].
An emigre now in West Germany corresponded that when he
became a "Stariki," he and a few of his comrades were deter-
mined to treat the first-year men better and with dignity.
This worked satisfactorily for a few weeks until a senior
enlisted man discovered that the source and his comrades were
being too easy on the "young ones." The lenient "old men"
were ordered to dump thirty buckets of water in their barracks
and clean it up with small rags. While these "Stariki" were
cleaning up the mess the "Molodye" were given free time.
After this incident, the senior NCO had a meeting with the
"Stariki" and told them to put more pressure on the first-
year sailors or this incident would repeat itself [110].
Fist fights broke out often between junior and senior
conscripts, particularly over the uniform exchange. Most of
these fights go unreported or are overlooked by senior enlisted
personnel and officers in all the services. This episode
told by a former private in the Air Defense forces
illustrates this:
...during dinner an "old man" received a slightly
yellowish enameled cup (Usually the "Stariki" received
only the new white cups) . The "old man" without
looking back threw the cup with all his strength into
the open kitchen door and hit a young Kirghiz soldier
who was on kitchen dutv directly on the forehead.
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The "young one" was in great pain, but he did not dare
to complain or seek revenge. The onlookers took the
whole episode as no more than part of the army life.
They all said, "That's the way things are." [90:5 1
It is apparent that the officers not only know about the
privileged position of the "old men" but readily encourage
it. An army NCO stated that the officers for whom he worked
did not find it unreasonable when a "Stariki" complained about
too much work to do. Officers said that the "old men" deserve
some privileges because they already know their jobs and
besides everybody gets to be an "old man" eventually [90:61.
The emigre who served on a cruiser out of Murmansk said
this conflict between junior and senior conscripts was the
worst single cause of problems aboard his ship. He said
authorities were attempting to deal with the ethnic problem
but the disruption caused by hazing was being overlooked [1071.
Hazing is a navywide Soviet problem and was a morale problem
on the Sorozhevoy.
F. ALCOHOLISM
Prince Vladimir of Kiev is said to have made Russia
Christian rather than Moslem because, as he put it, "It is
impossible to be happy in Russia without strong drink."
Alcoholism is a national malady wb.ich permeates the military
forces. Alcohol consumption among Soviet citizens accounts
for over a third of all consumer spending in food stores [13:44]
The situation in the armed forces shows that servicemen are
not exempt from the disease afflicting society as a whole.
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Alcoholism is both a cause and effect of low morale.
Alcohol represents an easy escape from the pressures and
hardships of military service in the USSR; conscripts, senior
enlisted men and officers use it extensively for this purpose.
The scope of the problem created by alcoholism is evident in
the press reports reflecting high-level concern with the
extent and impact of excessive drinking within the armed
forces. One article in Krasnaya Zvesda pointed out that more
than one-third of all military infractions are caused by
personnel under the influence of alcohol [42:52]. In the
same journal on August 17, 1974 an article proclaimed that
the Officers Club of the Baltic Fleet had made a training
film to strengthen military discipline to combat drunkeness.
Soviet regulations permit officers and NCO ' s to drink in
their off-duty hours. The conscripts, in theory, are not
allowed to drink at all, but the famous ingenuity of the
Russian soldier ivhich has been lauded in Soviet propaganda
since World War II proves itself when it comes to the problem
of getting a drink [90:13]. Strict discipline does not appear
to be an effective deterrent.
It appears this problem is more widespread in the army
rather than the navy, simply given the difficulty in smuggling
alcohol aboard ship (Alcohol is not officially allowed aboard
Soviet naval vessels) . Sailors who served at sea said alcohol
abuse was rare but occurred whenever alcohol became available.
Senior petty officers seem to be the greatest abusers of
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alcohol. One emigre reported that to be allowed to go on
leave, a conscript had to promise the First Sergeant a bottle
of vodka upon returning from home [110].
The Soviet version of moonshine is "samogan," which is
often produced on the farm in family-run stills. The military
is a great consumer of this "home brew." In the Naval Signal
Batallion outside Riga, the "Samogan" supply came from a
collective-farm woman who visited the mess hall once a week
to pick up leftovers for her pigs [110]. Other than some
hashish smoked by Central Asian soldiers in construction
battalions, alcohol appears to be the only drug in use, but
determined soldiers and sailors have resorted to drinking
cologne and alcohol used for cleaning.
Lieutenant Victor Belenko who flew his MIG-25 to Japan
only 10 months after the Storozhevoy mutiny told tales of the
problems of the drinking and black market sale of the grain
alcohol used in hydraulics and de-icers of the MIG-25. He
said fuel was often dumped to insure that statistics sent to
Moscow show the proper fuel to alcohol proportions was used
[5:82].
A sailor who served on K-8 class minesweepers from 1968
to 1971 told this author that on two different occasions he
could remember that sailors standing guard duty on the boats
were drunk. One fired his AK-47 into the air saying he thought
there was an air raid. Another lost his Kalasnikov and
himself over the side in a drunken stupor. The interviewed
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sailor was the diver that pulled the body and weapon out of
the water [106]. Both of these incidents were hushed-up by
local commanders.
The mutineers evidently counted on the drunken sleep of
some of their officers to aid in their escape to Sweden.
Alcohol problems, thus, not necessarily a direct cause of the
mutiny, apparently were taken into account by the conspirators.
Alcohol is said to be more valuable than Soviet currency.
"Anything can be bought with a bottle of vodka." [106]
There is certainly the potential that in the prelude to their
escape, the mutineers might have bought aid or silence with
alcohol. Indeed, they could have been drinking themselves.
G. OFFICER MORALE PROBLEMS
The discussions of morale problems and discontent thus
far have focused primarily upon the conscript ranks. Junior
officers have special morale problems in the Soviet Navy as
well. Since Sablin was joined by one other officer in the
conspiracy, it is important to examine the shipboard officer's
career and officer morale problems that may cause dissent.
The officer probably began his "selection" process at a
very early age. A great number are sons of naval officers
and party officials which leads to an inbred officer corps
which is often plagued by nepotism. The officer is supposed
to be politically reliable. This means he participated in
the "Little Octoberist" group from ages six through nine, the
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"All Union Pioneer Organization" from ten to fourteen and
probably joined the "All Union Lenin Communist Youth League
(Komosomol)" at fifteen; which leads to party affiliation at
28 years of age. Communist Party membership is not required
but there is certainly perceived pressure to join. As men-
tioned earlier, 95 percent of all naval officers are party
or Komosomol members [22:54].
As youths, many participated in activities under the guise
of "The All Union Voluntary Society for Cooperation With the
Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF)." This volunteer organ-
ization, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense,
provides 140 hours of premilitary training during the last
two years of secondary school to a majority of Soviet males.
The 1967 Universal Military Service Law required all male
citizens to join a local DOSAAF unit two years prior to the
conscription age of 18 [22:52]. Although DOSAAF engages in
military related sports, civil defense, and Soviet nationalism,
its primary purpose is to prepare youth to serve in the
military.
A majority of these youths enter the prestigious Nakhimov
Prep School in Leningrad at age 13 which substitutes for
normal secondary school. Approximately 50 percent of all
Soviet naval officers are graduates o^f Nakhimov. This school,
in addition to status benefits, allows graduates automatic
entry into one of the eleven Higher Naval Schools (HNS) which
produce officers in a similar fashion to our Naval Academy.
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Five of these schools educate surface line officers, two are
dedicated to line-engineering and one each to shore engineering,
submarines, radio-electronics and political affairs. Curricula
are five years duration and graduates are awarded baccalaureate
degrees. Eighty-five percent of the Soviet naval officer
corps are procured from one of these institutions. The re-
mainder come from civilian universities and technical schools
followed by ten weeks of Officer Candidate School [22:52].
The future navy line officers receive technical training in
a narrow specialty under old-fashioned rote techniques and
strict discipline. Naval pilots, doctors, civil engineers
and many other shore specialists come from universities run
by the other armed services and not one of the HNS ' s
.
Graduates are commissioned in the rank of lieutenant upon
graduation. The rank of junior-lieutenant, seldom used, is
reserved for marginal graduates and some direct commissions
from the enlisted ranks. They report aboard ship and begin
immediately to work in one of the five departments for which




Approximately 1500-2000 new officers enter the fleet each
year from the Higher Naval Schools. The top graduates get
their choice of fleet and ship type. North and Pacific Fleet,




The Soviet naval officer is a "specialist" and a "tech-
nician" foremost where his American counterpart is a
"generalist" and a "manager" first. Some of this difference
is driven bv necessity and some by choice. The large,
uneducated conscript force requires that the officers be
more technically proficient. Creation of the "Michman" rank
(IVarrant Officer) was an attempt to retain more enlisted
personnel by giving them more prestige thus relieving some of
the "hands-on" maintenance and repair function of the officers
[33:135].
Before a new shioboard officer begins his of f icer-of - the-
deck qualifications or becomes a division officer, he must
first qualify in his specialty as a third class, second class,
first class and master specialist just like enlisted personnel.
A great many Soviet officers feel that overstressing tech-
nical competence erodes traditional values of military
leadership [30:97].
The pay system is too complex to explain in terms of
dollars or roubles. Primarily rank and time- in- service deter-
mine pay with extra money given for housing and travel. Pilots,
submariners and remotely assigned personnel receive more
money due to their longevity credits. The most important
extra pay factor is position pay. This can be up to 100
percent more money if you are assigned to an important staff
or job. The officer's pay is quite good when compared with
many other occupations in Soviet life [47:77].
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Soviet officers accrue 50 days leave per year. Those
with more than 25 years of service, along with pilots, divers,
submariners and those in remote sites are alotted 45 days
[22:58].
Ninety percent of the Soviet officers stay until pension
at 25 years. This includes five years at the Higher Naval
School for most. Time spent in submarines or remote areas
like Petropavlovsk count as double time in service. Since
very few leave the service prior to retirement, the Officer
Corps is trapazoidal rather than triangular as in the U.S.
Navy. There is no "up-or-out" promotion system. Not being
selected for command or being passed over for promotion does
not end a man's career in the Soviet Navy.
The crucial point in the shipboard officer's career is
at the assistant-commander point (department head) probably
at the rank of captain-lieutenant. Here a decision is made
by the ship's commanding officer to determine if each officer
remains in the specialist career path or makes the lateral
transition over to executive officer (Starpom) and the command
path [30:98]. The specialist will continue to be promoted
and \\/ill serve on staffs, shore billets and in some cases stay
aboard ship in his speciality despite the fact that he out-
ranks the ship's commanding officer. This rank inversion is
commonplace in many areas of the Soviet Armed Forces and causes
complexities in the promotion system. Engineering and
Communications/Electronics specialists are not often considered
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for command leaving the officers in Navigation, ASW and
Weapons the best chance to be selected. Normally these offi-
cers at the captain-lieutenant level are given a couple of
chances for executive officer (XO) selection before becoming
career specialists.
As one can see, the shipboard CO holds a great deal of
sway over the careers of the officers in his wardroom. He
promotes the majority of his officers and selects his own
executive officer (Starpom) as previously cited. There also
is evidence that Soviet admirals can promote anyone merely
by decree for a number of reasons [103].
Upon completion of qualification as a master specialist,
the young junior officer undertakes both bridge watch quali-
fication and grouphead (division head) responsibilities.
Like most Soviet policies of more control from the top, the
XO or CO must be on the bridge of a Soviet ship at all times.
This puts a great deal of pressure on the qualifying junior
officer. He is constantly being quizzed by the qualified
of f icer-of -the-deck and either the CO or the XO. Although
he starts later in his qualification than his American
counterpart, the Soviet process certainly aids him in catching
up with his western counterpart.
It is possible for an officer to rise to command-at- sea
in approximately 16 years and spend all that time, if not
on the same ship, at least on the same ship type. Transfers
very seldom occur between fleets. A Pacific Fleet Officer
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who has been on "kashin" class destroyers will stay there.
Changes of specialty are almost unheard of since they require
extensive retraining [22:58].
There is a great deal of verbiage in Krasnaya Zvesda and
other journals concerning the importance and prestige of
commanders-at- sea . Fleet Admiral Gorshkov has stressed many
times that a CO must be a manager, able seaman, technician
and proponent of Marxism/Leninism [30:97]. The CO can also
"make or break" the careers of the rest of the officers in
his wardrooms. Many destroyers and cruisers are captained
by fairly junior officers; captains third or second rank
(LCDRS/CDRS) . There are documented cases of a Krivak class
ship being commanded by a senior lieutenant [50:98]. Despite
his junior rank, he has probably been at sea as much as an
American commander whose tours have been interrupted by
shore duty.
Captain William Manthorpe, in a Naval Institute Proceedings
article, cites that there is a great deal of propaganda con-
cerning the young CO's. The literature is quoted as saying
that the system puts the best in command no matter the rank
and that this process is warmly received by all. Captain
Manthorpe contends that there is a great deal of friction,
particularly from the engineer staff specialist who outrank
the captain a majority of the time [30:97].
Evidence in literature points to central control in the
Navy being "destalinized. " Admiral Gorshkov states the aim
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of trying to get commanding officers with more initiative and
giving them more responsibility. Such initiative, however is
often damaged by the Soviet style of command. When an
admiral is embarked on a Soviet ship, for example, he often
rides the bridge and cons the ship when entering or leaving
port and during channel transits [33:137].
Those officers who do not make command selection rotate
to afloat staffs or shore stations after completion of their
department head tour. These staff specialists go afloat with
an admiral but not always on the flagship. The destroyer
squadron staff engineer may spend a whole deployment aboard
a ship with a particularly junior engineer or one with
engineering problems. The staff engineer would run the depart-
ment while he was aboard. The U.S. Navy would call that
excessive oversight; the Soviets call it efficient use of
trained assets. Although Soviet propaganda says specialists
have equal chance for promotion, interviews appear to indicate
that this is not so [103]. Just as they do with their ships,
planes, and other military hardware, however, the Soviets
squeeze all they can out of these specialist before they are
retired.
Like all Soviet decision-making, naval command is highly
centralized, carefully limited and closely monitored by the
organs of the party. It shares with the rest of the system
the relationship in which the senior officer is reluctant to
delegate authority and the subordinate is unwilling to accept
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responsibility. Articles in open sources criticize both
senior officers for not permitting subordinates more leeway
and junior officers for not delegating more responsibility
to Michmen (Warrant Officers) and enlisted men. Articles
also repeatedly stress the need for decisiveness, initiative
and innovation on the part of junior commanders. Not wanting
to "stick out" and wanting to just be part of the group are
a part of Russian and Soviet culture. There is evidence that
points to a reluctance on the part of junior officers to
operate beyond the letter of the orders received or to act in
the absence of orders. It, seems, however, that the Soviets
have decentralized enough such that field commanders can make
decisions when necessary.
In summary, Soviet naval officers are highly trained
volunteers, frequently drawn from relatives of party members
or of other naval officers. Soviet naval officers are expected
to be political and military leaders and "hands on" technical
experts, familiar with every task in their division. Promotion
is based upon vacancies and the CO's recommendation rather
than annual promotion boards [33:135]. A few officers rise
very rapidly based on this somewhat subjective selection for
command. The many officers not selected for command positions
remain as technical experts for many years after their con-




Although officers have far more privileges than enlisted
personnel and receive much more pay, the hardships associated
with sea duty weigh also on the officers. Junior officers
have morale problems as well. In being assigned to the same
job and ship for up to six years, they may have a chance to
be judged by only one or two commanding officers. If they
escape notice, they may remain technicians for the rest of
their careers. There is frequently the feeling that advance-
ment requires friends in Moscow [105]. Junior officers are
frequently overburdened with additional duties and various
political committee assignments and find it often difficult
to perform normal military duties.
Junior Soviet naval officers resent seniors who dominate
and do not decentralize, and yet among all officers, there
is a pervasive fear of making a wrong decision and being
reprimanded to the detriment of their careers. Soviet naval
doctrine recognizes the need for decisive initiative at all
levels, but it seems higher ranking officers interfere in
even the most insignificant decisions, thus stifling initiative
at lower levels. Most officers decide to stay in the Navy
because they perceive they are better off than most Soviet
civilians. This is not an indicator, however, that they are




H. OTHER FACTORS AND CONCLUSIONS
All of the interviewees and open source literature cite
many instances of absenteeism. Unauthorized absence (AWOL)
and desertion would be effects of low morale rather than
causes. They will not therefore be discussed in the causes
of the Storozhevoy mutiny. The author realizes, however,
that high desertion rates and high AV/OL rates which are pre-
valent in some Soviet units, lead to further unrest and other
problems
.
Political education is a source of some dissatisfaction
among enlisted personnel, especially because there are many
new enlistees who were not formerly Komosomol members and who
now find that they must join and pay dues [110]. Sailors
resent the large amount of time consumed by tedious political
education classes. They recognize the disputes between poli-
tical officers and professional military officers; disputes
which sometimes disrupt an orderly chain-of -command. One
former conscript described the weekly political meeting as
boring with the same contents week after week [110]
.
Suicide may be viewed as among the most drastic responses
to the prolonged frustration of military life. Dr. Richard
Gabriel, in his studies of moral in the Soviet Army, found
suicide prevalent enough to be significantly alarming [15:29]
This author, through his research and his interviews, has not
found the same to be true in the Soviet Navy.
74

On cruises it is normal for Soviet ships to be at sea or
at anchor for six months at a time. Shore leave in foreign
countries is restricted to those considered to be "ideologi-
cally safe" and even then sailors go ashore in supervised
groups [103]. At home, liberty is granted three evenings a
week to one-third of the crew until 11 P.M. One sailor stayed
out all night by buying vodka and other favors for the chief
petty officer in charge of his section [l06]. Leave to go
home is not an entitlement for the conscripts. The conscript
may be awarded 10 days in his second or third year if his
supervisors feel he has earned it [11:105].
From 1964 to 1975 the number of days that Soviet ships
have operated away from the Soviet Union has risen from 4,000
to close to 48,000 [10:42]. Consequently, leave and time
with families has been reduced accordingly. For those senior
petty officers who had been in the Navy since the early
sixties, this drastic change in operating pattern must have
seemed like a violation of the contract that they agreed to
when they decided to make the Navy a career. Even when docked
at their homeport, sailors have spoken of the rigors of the
training day which preclude any leave or liberty. Leave is
often used as an indictment to get conscripts to join in
denunciation of a fellow conscript and come forward with
various crimes of others voluntarily. The schedule of the
Storozhevoy in the year prior to the mutiny included a great
deal of at sea time as mentioned earlier. That lon^ time at
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sea, plus the fact that all leaves were cancelled due to the
Angola period, would lead one to believe that sailors could
be very frustrated and overworked.
If one looks at the potential causes cited thus far, one
can see ample reason for dissent, but not necessarily enough
for mutiny. The one cause that seems to have tied the others
together was the obvious frustration that Comrade Captain
Third Rank Sablin must have felt with the Soviet System. He
had been awarded two Orders of Lenin during his Naval service
[60]. As a Naval officer, he was in a privileged class in a
"classless" society. Officers receive special privileges for
certain sanatariums (resorts) . They have a well-stocked
"voentorg" (Soviet PX) which carries many hard to get imported
goods. The most important factor however is the status the
Soviet officer holds in the Soviet society. They are con-
tinuously praised in both civilian and military press.
Soviet officers are always looked upon with high regard and
esteem. They are the "elite of the elites." They are allowed
to travel. Some current authors see a change in this, but
for the present this status attracts many men into the officer
corps. Sablin enjoyed benefits far in excess of the civilian
population and yet he still chose to lead a mutiny against
his homeland.
In his role as chief political teacher, Sablin's lack of
ideological zeal was passed on to the crew of the Storozhevoy.
This lack of "Party consciousness" was singled out by the
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military hierarchy a year before the mutiny. In the 1974
article in Krasnaya Zvesda discussed at length earlier, it
was cited that the crew had the technical expertise to do
well but lacked the commitment to the "Communist collective"
to become an outstanding ship. This article, appearing one
year prior to the mutiny, is evidence that trouble had been
brewing for some time. Such evidence supports a view that
the mutiny was not a spontaneous uprising.
The Captain apparently was not aware of the problems on
his own ship, since the person designated to keep him abreast
of crew morale was his Zampolit, in this case the person who
was fueling the dissent. One might speculate how someone
with Sablin's views could get to the job of political officer
on a major Soviet combatant ship? Certainly there was a
breakdown in the selection process. In this case it must be
evident that the military background of his family and his
ability as a leader got him the job. Sablin probably did not
want the job, but numerous sources have said that to turn
down a political officer job, if it is offered to you, is
career suicide [108].
Enough evidence has been put forth to show that the mutiny
aboard the Storozhevoy was not a spontaneous uprising but a
well thought-out conspiracy. The timing is certainly a major
indicator. The rapport that Sablin must have established
with crewmen to even divulge such a plot to them required
months of planning. In a society where distrust is the norm
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and friendships take years to build, this rapport had to be
monumental
.
Some might question Sablin's ability to get petty officers
and conscripts to go along with his plan either willingly or
even unwillingly, but passive submission to any authority has
been inbred in the Russian population for centuries. The
Russians have "created a tendency to avoid the exercise of
initiative and an unwillingness, even inability to undertake
a task without constant supervision." [33:130] The passive
acceptance of the Stalinist terror is a prime example. The
small size of the dissident movement, especially the Russian
participation in it, attests to this passive acceptance of
authority. Russian people desire both control and freedom.





VIII. ISOLATED INSTANCE OR TIP OF THE ICEBERG
This study has focused on one dramatic incident. One key
question remains: was this an isolated incident or merely
the tip of an iceberg of dissent an.d unrest in the Soviet Navy?
Are there other instances of unrest to which one might point?
The Soviet Navy and the Czarist-Russian Navy before it
have had repeated instances of unrest. In 1905, sailors
aboard the battleship, Potemkin, enraged over maggot-ridden
meat which the ship's surgeon declared fit for consumption,
killed their officers and took over the ship. They attempted
to join striking workers in Odessa but were forced to abandon
their revolt in Romania. This ending was not shown in
Eisenstein's classic Soviet film "Potemkin." [19]
This author realized the difficulty in using a 70-year-old
Czarist mutiny which occurred just after the Russian defeat
in the Russo-Japanese War to show evidence that there are
other examples of mutiny in the Soviet Navy. It is important
to note that many Czarist traditions and training programs
were carried forward into the Soviet Army and Navy. Between
1918 and 1929, 48,109 ex-imperial officers were taken into
the Red Army and Navy [12:82].
The Baltic Fleet was heavily involved in the Bolshevik
revolution in 1917. The 60,000 sailors had importance out
of all proportion with their numbers. The most violent
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episodes o£ the February revolution took place at the Kronstadt
and Helsingfors Naval bases. A shot fired from the cruiser
Aurora is part of the legend of the October Revolution. The
crew members of an earlier destroyer named "Storozhevoy" were
active participants.
Sailors at the Kronstadt Naval Base in the Gulf of Finland
revolted against the new Bolshevik government in February 1921.
Shouting slogans of "Free Soviets" and "Down with the Commis-
sarocracy", they held out for two weeks before they were
bloodily suppressed by Lenin's Red Guards [80:8]. After this
uprising, Lenin almost disbanded the Fleet.
In the spring of 1959, a large contingent of Soviet Naval
personnel was stationed in Gdynia, Poland to train members of
the Indonesian Navy in destroyer tactics and the use of their
Soviet equipment. Commanding a "SKORY" class destroyer of
the contingent xvas Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov. He
was the youngest commanding officer in Soviet history at the
age of twenty- seven. Artamonov seemed a brilliant product of
the Soviet system. He exemplified the concept of the "New
Soviet Man". He had been lauded by name in Krasnaya Zvesda
and Morskoy Sbornik (Soviet Naval Digest). Artamonov had also
been praised for his proficiency in propagandizing Communist
Party decisions among his officers and men [20:59].
In July 1959, Captain Artamonov gave up his brilliant
future in the Soviet Navy by fleeing across the Baltic to
neutral Sweden. He escaped with his twenty-one year old
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fiance', Eva Gora. He gave up his chauffeured limosine and
other countless privileges to settle in the United States
under the name Nicolas George Shadrin. His reasons for de-
fecting came out later in his debrief and testimony before
the House Un-American Activities Committee on September 13,
1960. Underneath his "good communist" exterior had boiled a
deep hatred of the Soviet system which he had kept well hidden.
He testified that he was not alone with these feelings in the
Soviet Navy.
Shadrin, after years of work for the Defense Intelligence
Agency and Naval War College, disappeared in Vienna around
Christmas 1975. He had been recruited to work for the CIA in the
counter-intelligence field. He was presumably kidnapped by the
Soviets. The death sentence he was given in absentia for his
defection in 1959 was presumably put into effect [20:180].
Vladimar Gavrilov \vas a Soviet sailor from 1960 to 1964
and later emigrated to V-'est Germany. In 1963, as a radio
operator aboard a radar patrol ship in the Pechanga area of
the Soviet northern fleet, he organized a group of sailors who
met during movie showings. Under the guise of studying
Marxism-Leninism they clandestinely concerned themselves with
criticizing the Soviet government and unifying the disaffected
[16:2]. They met in the engine-room, so that no one else
could hear their dangerous deliberations. The group wrote a
letter to the Central Committee of the Albanian Labor Party
expressing their dissatisfaction with Soviet socialism and
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the government's disregard for the working man. They had
planned to send the letter through a friend at the Czechoslo-
vakian embassy. Other Czechs forwarded the letter to the KGB
[16:3]. Gavrilov spent three years in a labor camp prior to
being allowed to emigrate.
In June 1969, three Soviet Naval officers, also of the
Baltic fleet, were arrested in Paldiski for alleged anti-
Soviet activities. They were planning to circulate documents
urging liberalization and democratization of the Soviet society.
They had also signed their names to an essay by well-known
dissident Andrei Sakharov critical of the Soviet Union. The
three officers, Captain-Lieutenant Gavrilov, Lieutenant
Paramonov and a third Kosyrev were believed to have been
assigned aboard a nuclear submarine in Talinn [44:175]. Sources
quoted in the Mew York Times said that "One of the three had
been engaged in political work." [87]
In 1970 a Soviet sailor went beserk aboard a Kotlin class
destroyer in the Mediterranean. He wounded four other sailors
with an automatic weapon before being shot and killed himself
[45:185] .
These cases are well-documented. There are rumors of
mutinies that were spread throughout the Soviet Navy. Reports
of an attempted mutiny aboard a nuclear submarine in the Baltic
in 1969 and another aboard a diesel submarine in a Norwegian
Fjord in 1972 were both related to this author [107]. A
shorebased conscript in an interview remembered a story of t^vo
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Warrant Officers who in 1974 killed an officer and attempted
to desert in the Valga area. They were both apprehended and
shot [109].
A recent dramatic episode leads this author to speculate
that violent dissent continues to be a problem. The incident
involving the Echo class nuclear submarine which surfaced
disabled east of Okinawa in August, 1980, still requires a
satisfactory explanation. The three Soviet officers who
boarded a British tanker for help reported there had been a
fire. While officers radioed for help, men from the tanker
took 55 persons off the submarine. They estimated that nine
crewmen had died. The Captain of the tanker found no evidence
of fire on the men, the bodies, or the deck of the submarine.
The Captain's analysis was confirmed by infrared photography
by Japanese reconnaissance planes [8:146]. The theory held
by many that a nuclear accident had occurred was also held
inconsistent by Japanese planes when no abnormal radiation
level was discovered. Had another mutiny been attempted? We
will probably never know but certainly the basis for dissent
was there.
These examples of unrest cited are few and far between.
One must assume that in a closed society such as the Soviet
Union, that those things which are public are only examples




The fact that an article in the military newspaper was
critical of Storozhevoy for its lack of ideological commitment,
could be indicative in itself that the problem is not on that
ship alone. Many analysts of the Soviet press, including
Hedrick Smith in The Russians
,
state that there is a policy
to "criticize but don't generalize." In other words, it is
all right to find fault in a particular situation but don't
write general conclusions because that is politically dangerous
Smith states:
Each case of corruption or mismanagement in some distant
city or province is treated in print as an isolated
shortcoming, and yet by giving it prominence in the
national press, the Party bosses are signalling their
nationwide apparatus that this is a general problem to
be dealt with forthwith [50:494].
There has been a great deal of writing about the nature
and problems of unrest in the Soviet Army. Since most of the
emigres to the West served in the Army, getting data is much
easier. To simply say that the problems of the Army apply to
the Mavy would be a mistake. The Navy is small, elite, more
technically-oriented, more ethnically Slavic than the Army.
It receives the best of the conscripts. It doesn't have the
language or reliability problem associated with large numbers
of Central Asians in its ranks. It is just these factors
that makes the mutiny all the more important. If the Soviet
Navy High Command cannot trust the crew of one of its front-
line ships, other units are suspect if not of mutiny possibly
of other debilitating problems.
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IX. THE IMPORTANT OF HUMAN FACTORS
IN ASSESSING MILITARY CAPABILITY
This study has focused on a number o£ instances where
dissent and unrest in the Voyenno Morskoy Flot (Soviet Navy)
have erupted into violence, mutiny or peaceful protest. This
study has also discussed current morale conditions, both cause
and effect, which appear to point to continued unrest and
dissent. They may not indicate a disintegration of the
Voyenno Morskoy Flot (VMF) as a viable force, but they make
it evident that we must incorporate these human factors into
some conceptual framework for gauging the military power of
the Soviet Navy. Defense planners must have some net assess-
ment of the comparable naval strengths based on both
quantifiable and nonquantif iable factors.
Current literature contains numerous comparisons of the
seagoing armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States
In a 1981 Department of Defense document, Soviet Military
Poxver
,
the buildup of the VMF was described as follows:
Over the last two decades the Soviet Navy has been
transformed from a basically coastal defense force
into an ocean-going force designed to extend the
military capability (emphasis added) of the USSR well
out to sea and to perform the functions of tactical,
theater, and strategic naval power in waters distant
from the Soviet Union. The Soviets have a larger
array of general purpose submarines, surface warships
and combat naval aircraft than any other nation [94:39]
Admiral Stansfield Turner described the naval balance
this way in 1977:
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As a seagoing power, the U.S. is moving into a shrinking
range of political options and a higher level of risk.
For this there are two reasons: a major industrial
power, the Soviet Union, is building up a navy with
dogged determination, reacting to its perception of a
threat from our once overwhelming armed superiority
at sea. ... [58: 339]
.
In 1979 the Soviets were considered to have 560 major
surface combatants compared with only 350 for the U.S. Navy.
Another study had a major U.S. Naval surface combatant force
exceeding that of the Soviets in ship tonnage 2.6 million to
2.4 million tons [63:30]. Both of these figures are correct
yet neither figure gives any indication of which means greater
military capability.
There are many shortcomings in the way military power is
assessed today, yet policy-makers continue to make budget
decisions based on drastically simplified numerical estimates.
Such emphasis on quantification is due to the difficulty in
measuring human factors and other subjective indicators.
v;hat is military power or capability? Is it the ability
to achieve certain desired missions in light of enemy capa-
bility or is it an absolute which exists without relative
comparison? Evidently it is a little of both. Examining and
measuring military power and combat effectiveness are difficult
and complex, mainly because they are based in no small part
on political-psychological factors that are in turn influenced
by a variety of forces that are subjective and vary from one
situation to another. The situation is compounded by the
difficulties in relating objective and subjective criteria.
86

questions of validity of data, the different perspectives
from which the problem of peacetime naval balance is viewed
and the ambiguity of methodology.
There are a number of ways which a country's military
power is currently being estimated; all are frought with prob-
lems and inaccuracies. The majority of these methods rely
on those indicators of military power which are quantifiable
and disregard other elements. There is a great reliance on
objective criteria and the collection of empirical data.
Understandably these are easier to collect, measure, and
analyze
.
The trend to attempt to quantify military power and reduce
war to mathematical patterns is not a new one. References
to such attempts are found in the notebooks of Leonardo da
Vinci, in the ballistics studies of Galileo, in the works of
Machiavelli, Vauban and Jomini. The application of statis-
tical techniques to tactics is a major subtheme in military
historiography. From the seventeenth century onward, mathe-
matics became a major component of officer education in the
West, a trend which has increased steadily up to today. Oper-
ations research is now an important part of any military
curriculum.
How useful then are quantified approaches in the search
for measurement of military power and capability? Operational
research in V/orld War II clearly enhanced fighting capacity
in a number of areas, but has it aided planners in assessing

enemy or friendly force capabilities? The McNamera era of
the 1960 's brought systems analysis and operations research
to the forefront in all areas of military analysis. This
trend was admittedly under way but dramatically accelerated
by McNamera' s accession to the office of Secretary of Defense.
Although operational research and its descendants have
had their successes, many have expressed skepticism regarding
such rigorously quantified approaches. One of the most ardent
critics is Hyman Rickover: "I have no more faith in the
ability of social scientists to quantify military effectiveness
than I do numerologists to calculate the future." [46:29]
Edward Luttwak, a Georgetown scholar and Reagan advisor stated
"Logic and calculation are no substitute for military instinct.
Military professionals have abandoned the study of history
and opted for untested models." [46:30]
The most commonly used quantifiable measure of military
power is comparison of defense expenditures. The rationale
for using this technique to measure capability lies in the
belief that weapons capability is related to cost. It is
evident that this indicator is really peripheral to the assess-
ment of military effectiveness. For many nations, military
spending is not related to capability at all because of the
complex interplay of military aid, regular arms procurement,
gifts and nonmaterial forms of payment to arms donors and the
like. Nations may mispresent their defense budgets for
security reasons. Budget figures for defense spending do not
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necessarily reveal where the money is spent. High defense
spending may be an indicator of reliance on the military to
maintain domestic order. Inflation means that it takes more
and more money to buy fewer and fewer weapons. Since infla-
tion rates vary from country to country and international
exchange rates are often arbitrary, equating monetary units
across national boundaries becomes extremely tenuous. Even
if one could equate budgetary data it would still be difficult
to define military capability on the basis of defense expendi-
tures. V/hile price and weapons sophistication are closely
correlated, price and capability are not. Certainly comparing
the cost of a C-5A transport and the F-111 fighter doesn't
give one an accurate comparison of capability. Some analysts
have, in a related methodology, attempted to measure capability
by the dollar valuation of weapon production costs. In other
words, what would be the cost of producing some system in the
U.S.? This would give us some sense of a weapons true
ecpnomic value but not of its capability.
A very common method of measuring military power is the
inventory technique. With this approach countries are com-
pared in terms of their respective inventories ie. the number
of Migs and Phantoms or surface, combatant ships. In some
respects this numerical inventory approach is more reliable
than the budgetary approach, particularly since highly visible
weapons , such as airplanes and tanks are difficult to hide
and many countries' supplies of arms are known. Even though
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major weapon systems can be counted easily, correlating
inventories with capability is difficult because qualitative
differences exist among individual weapons and among countries
respective skill in their utilization. Experiences in the
past Middle East wars, where the outnumbered Israeli forces
triumphed, show how combatants with smaller and presumably
less potent arms inventories can win major victories. Never-
theless, national weapons inventories are often tallied under
the wrongful assumption that the greater the arms stockpile,
the more poxverful it is.
Implicitly when numbers are used one tends to be led to
expect that equal forces lead to equal power. The whole
history of military engagements tends to indicate that this
is far from the case. One has only to cite the extremely
successful German attack in 1940 on the combined French and
British armies to indicate that equality of forces and equip-
ment does not lead to a stalemated outcome. The greatest
danger of numerical comparisons is the unwarranted sense of
surety and completeness that these methods suggest.
Superior numbers in just troops have not always produced
victories either. Fredrick the Great beat 80,000 Austrians
at Leuthen with only 30,000 men. Napolean emerged victorious
at Dresden with 100,000 fewer troops than his opponents [59:199]
The earlier cited example of Germany accepting an adverse one-
to-nine ratio in division strength on the eastern front in
V/orld War II is but another example of where numbers of troops
and weapons were not the leading factor in the outcome.
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At another level o£ comparing the numbers within military
forces to determine relative military power, most analysts
avoid judgement as to the circumstances under which these
numbers of forces might meet. For example, historically the
rule-o£-thumb that the offense needs a three-to-one advantage
to defeat the defense is not brought in to force comparisons.
In addition, no numerical figure is given to the value of
strategic surprise.
Even if one could calculate the combat capability of in-
dividual ships or units, the capability of two or more of
these groups operating together is not necessarily the sum of
the capabilities of the parts. The capability of a U.S.
carrier task force is not the sum of the power of each
individual ship or aircraft.
A military unit may perform extremely well under certain
conditions and poorly under others. Adverse conditions may
drive one unit to greater capability and another to less than
optimal performance. For example, in Vietnam, units which
performed I'/ell against North Vietnamese regulars did not do
so well against xvomen and children armed with satchel charges.
Weapon number comparisons overlook technological factors.
A highly sophisticated plane flown by a pilot from a less
developed country may not be as militarily capable as a less
sophisticated plane flown by a more proficient pilot. In
addition, where technology is equal, specific weapons are often
designed for specific purposes rendering a weapon's relative
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capability dependent on what circumstance it is used. Further
complicating the matter of measuring capability in terms of
weapon system inventories are the effects of additional sit-
uational variables such as user training, tactics, and a
factor which has been found to be most important - logistics.
It is evident that merely adding up all U.S. Naval forces
and comparing them \vith Soviet Naval forces, actual or potential
does not really tell one very much. One has to predict the
conditions under which two forces might engage before such
listings develop even the slightest significance. We must
develop some subjective notions as to the liklihood of certain
contingencies before we can begin to compare force levels.
Quantitative measures of military power avoid these sub-
jective and intuitive considerations. In the final analysis
these subjective factors may be the most indicative of military
capability and the ones which should be focused on more closely
in the assessment of our adversaries. This author recognizes
the historical difficulty in trying to measure subjective
factors and attempt to account for the variety of imponderables
that are characteristic of any military conflict situation.
The battle environment of the 1980 's may confront the individual
soldier or sailor with a greater degree of stress, contradictions
and ambiguity than in the past, xvhich brings us to the most
important group of subjective factors in assessing military
power and capability - the human factors.
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It is even difficult to come up with some sort of consensus
of what these human factors consist of, and a prioritization
of their relative importance. The factors include domestic
value systems, the will to fight, ideological commitment,
leadership style and ability, unit cohesion, domestic support
for the military and its mission and military or fighting
spirit
.
General Carl von Clausewitz, the most important classical
military theorist referred to these same human factors as
"moral elements." In On War he said:
?loral forces are amongst the most important subjects in
war. They form the spirit which permeates the whole
being of war. These forces fasten themselves soonest
and with the greatest affinity on to the will which puts
in motion and guides the whole mass of power, uniting
with it as it were in one stream, because this is a
moral force itself [59:177].
In reference to the difficulty in dealing with these sub-
jective factors he stated:
Unfortunately they will escape from all book analysis,
for they will neither be brought into numbers nor
classes, they must be seen or felt... Although little
or nothing can be said about these things in books
still they belong in the theory of the Art of War, as
much as everything else which constitutes war.... I
must repeat that it is a miserable philosophy if we
establish rules and principles wholly regardless of
all moral forces, and then as soon as the forces make
their appearance we begin to count exceptions [59:177].
Clausewitz found that the importance of human factors was best
exemplified by history where they were the greatest single
important factor in battle. He said the chief moral powers
were; "...the talents of the commander, the military virtue of
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the army and its national feeling." [49:181] He defined
military virtue as; "...bravery, aptitude for military service,
powers of endurance and enthusiasm. [49:181]
Lewis Sorley defined those moral forces to be morale,
discipline, commitment, leadership and cohesion. He states
that these factors, although difficult to measure, are the
crucial determinants of military effectiveness [46:48].
Morale factors historically have been perceived as more
important by some combatants than others. In World War II
ivhen faced with the situation of only a dwindling limited air
evacuation of his surrounded 6th Army at Stalingrad, the
German commander, General Friedrich Paulus, felt evacuation
of the most able-bodied and best commanders would be the most
effective course of action so they they could be used else-
where in the German war effort. The German high command
determined this would have severe detrimental effects on morale
of the xvhole army. The commander was overruled and the wounded
were brought out instead [46:40].
It appears that morale and human factors were not held to
be as important by some U.S. military leaders in Vietnam. The
pattern to rotate individuals in and out rather than rotating
entire units in and out is considered not to enhance unit
cohesion and fighting spirit. Leaders are now beginning to
realize the importance of domestic support for the military
abroad to enhance morale.
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The Soviets, after devastating losses early in World War
II, reinstituted military ranks and returned czarist uniforms
to the armed forces. This was evidently an attempt to restore
"fighting spirit" to the purged and war decimated army, since
it appeared xMarxist-Leninist rhetoric was not effective in
enhancing fighting spirit.
The Soviets today write a great deal about human factors
and the psychology of the soldier. An article in the July
1977 edition of Morskoy Sbornik criticized the division officer
of a young sailor who had continuously been a discipline prob-
lem. The officer was criticized for only monitoring the
technical progress of his subordinates and not their commit-
ments to the party and "socialist competition." [25:34]
The same article went on to laud another young officer
who kept in the Soviet equivalent of the division officer's
notebook a record of not only his sailors' technical prowess,
but each sailor's "socialist commitment on the ideological-
political level and their progress in developing moral-combat
and psychological qualities." [25:34]
In the final analysis the only sure measure of military
power is the performance of the military in actual combat.
Obviously one cannot wait for wars to ascertain the combat
state of the military. Some measure of effectiveness, imperfect
as it may be, is necessary. A realistic measure of combat
capability therefore, must include a mix of objective and




This study addresses primarily the ability to assess one's
own or one's adversaries military power as it relates to war
winning. Military power has different dimensions in regard
to deterrence and the political benefits gained or lost by
the threat of armed conflict. Perception of credibility,
national will and an opponent's capabilities enter into deter-
rence and threats of armed conflict where perception of capa-
bility is not necessarily a factor in the outcome of war at
sea or on the battlefield. It is actual capability, not per-
ception, that effects the outcome of battle. Human factors
have less impact in terms of peacetime balance than they do
in wartime. Morale of the forces may not affect deterrence of
war to the extent that it affects the outcome of a war.
To more accurately estimate military capability, this
author proposes dividing the indicators into three areas:
quantifiable, partly-quantifiable and non-quantifiable. Those
quantifiable measures of numbers of ships, weapons and troops,
allocation of resources for defense, and weapons firing tests
could be put together by the best operations research analyst
to give one a military balance from which to begin analysis.
The partly-quantifiable factors include first, the strategic
framework of the conflict which entails geography and climate
of combattants and area of operations. Strategic surprise
and offense versus defense can be partially quantified along
with technological quality and maintenance of arms, extent of
training and combat experience. These factors through
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"subjective measurement techniques" like Delphi method and
multi-attribute utility theory could give us numerical values
through "expert generated data." This data, in turn, could
be incorporated with earlier quantitative military balance
data to increase the understanding of relative military power.
Finally those indicators which cannot be quantified, the
moral factors which include leadership, morale, fighting
spirit, ideological commitment, unit cohesion, synergism (the
ability of a force to produce an effect greater than the sum
of its parts), staying power, discipline, commitment and
probably other related values should be considered by the
analyst. Only after careful analysis and study and a prioriti
zation of these human factors in one's ox^/n mind, can one then
make a relative intuitive judgement as to their impact on
the estimate of overall military power. The one factor which
is most important v/ill vary from one scenario to the next.
The key when combining the estimates from each area is
that the effects are multiplicative not additive. One nation
might have the greatest number of technologically superior
ships with the best trained crews in the world, but if the
morale and unit cohesion are zero the whole equation would
go to zero.
How then do the morale problems of the Soviet Navy effect
the estimate of its combat capability. The closed society
of the Soviet Union filters what we know of morale in their
navy. The scope and severity of morale problems remain
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largely hidden from view. Even in units that we can observe
from emigre reports, an unknown portion of the morale problem
remains latent. These morale problems are effectively
suppressed by a harsh totalitarian system of physical controls.
In conclusion, we cannot quantify the morale problem in
the Soviet Navy or define with numerical precision its impact
on readiness during peacetime or its potential for degrading
war fighting capability. Intuitively, however, one must say
the aforementioned problems and instances of dissent could
have a significant impact on the abilities of naval crews to
fight as effectively as they otherwise could have. Many
Soviet citizens, especially ethnic Russians have a deep-seated
basic loyalty to "Mother Russia." Many also have some com-
mitment to socialism. Despite internal opposition to the
regime, the majority of the Soviet population including the
Navy will rally against a perceived threat to the survival of
the nation. The Soviet Navy no^v is engaging in power pro-
jection and "sabre-rattling" at points distant from the Soviet
Union. A threat far from the homeland would have to be great
indeed to threaten the survival of the state. War is violent
business. The pressure of combat may be the spark to turn
passive acceptance into rebellion as Captain Valery Mikhaylovich
Sablin was the spark for the crew of the Storozhevoy. '
It is understood that military decision-makers, out of
necessity need to plan for the worst-case enemy, but there is
little evidence that the Soviet military could reverse or
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overturn the negative effect morale would have on the VMF '
s
war at sea capability. Thus by incorporation of these human
factors in their assessment, the Soviet Mavy is not as powerful
as other estimates would lead one to believe.
The U.S. Navy is not without morale problems. Dissent
erupted into small scale insurrections aboard the aircraft
carriers Kitty Hawk and Constellation. These instances in the
late sixties and early seventies were reflective of U.S.
societal problems at the time. The racial tensions, drug
problems and Vietnam War were brought to the forefront under
the adversity of shipboard life. Although these problems have
been cured somewhat in the U.S. Navy, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt in
On V/atch
,
admitted that he felt these problems were reducing
the effectiveness of carriers on the line in Vietnam.
These problems the U.S. Navy faced were known to all due
to the news media in the American "open society." It was
recognized that these tensions were limiting the effectiveness
of the Navy, and steps were immediately taken, and are still
in progress, to combat and eliminate the causal problems. It
is only logical to assume that the morale problems facing the
VT4F about which we have only limited knowledge, problems so






This author is certainly not saying that mutiny is about
to occur in all Soviet Naval vessels, because in the case of
the Storozhevoy all the conditions were just right with the
political officer acting as the catalyst. There must be,
however, other Sablins and Belenkos waiting for the right time
to make their respective moves.
A relatively grim picture has been painted about morale
in the Soviet Navy. The study has looked at the problems,
causes and effects of low morale, but there are a few counter-
vailing factors. These factors don't eliminate the problems
but are important to any accurate analysis. Morale in some
Soviet units is good. Exceptional individual leaders can
overcome a great deal of other factors. In addition morale
of a combat unit is heavily dependent on the course of events
in wartime. Peacetime morale problems do not always translate
into unwillingness to fight in wartime, but certainly there
is a correlation.
A life of exposure to propaganda and political indoctrina-
tion has conditioned the average Soviet sailor to accept
government claims of the threat of aggression from the West
and from China. Many sailors also share a commitment to
socialism, even if not the Soviet version. These factors may
lead a sailor to believe there is a threat to "Mother Russia"
even if no actual one exists.
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The Soviet Navy has grown from a coastal defense force to
an awesome "blue-water" fleet. The Storozhevoy incident does
not mean that the Navy is weak or is not a threat, but it does
mean that it is vulnerable. The discontent in the ranks of
Soviet soldiers and sailors may be a chink in the armor of
the Soviet military machine that can be exploited by the West.
There is no doubt that the Soviet Navy would fight to
defend "?'!other Russia" as did its forebears, but this one
vulnerability, morale problems, may help to offset the growing
disadvantage in numbers of weapons platforms that the V/est faces
If the Soviet Naval High Command is to learn anything
from the incident, it would be that people count more than
ships. The Soviets always pay lip service to this fact, but
if they want to prevent the next Sablin on board the next
Storozhevoy, something tangible must be done. Perhaps mutiny
was the wrong word to use in this instance, since the only
use the mutineers intended to make of the ship was to use it
as a vehicle of illegal emigration. To go to the extremes of
such a desperate act, risking the ultimate consequences, must






(Article by Captain 2nd rank I LYSENKO, a regular correspondent,
after a visit' to BPK STOROZHEVOY probably in November 1974.
Krasnaya Zvesda (Red Star) 24 December 1974)
1. On being detailed off the BPK "Storozhevoy" I went happily;
I had my reasons. First of all, I knew the crew well, and a
meeting with people with whom I had done more than one ocean
voyage and for whose returns I'd waited is always desirable.
Besides this there was to be in the ship a party election
meeting and I expected some serious discussion on the work
of the communists on board. In the past training year, the
crew of the "Storozhevoy" had made a new step forward in
combat improvement, to which the crew's successful missile
firings and gun shoots bear witness. The Minister of Defense,
Marshal Grechko, went to sea on board this ship and evaluated
highly the mastery of the anti-submariners who destroyed the
targets with the first missiles. In a word the "Storozhevoy"
had all the requirements necessary to win first place in the
ranks of outstanding ships.
2. But at the end of the training year it became clear that
the ship could not do better than 4th place. I surmised that
the ship's communists at their party meeting, would try to
fathom out where and in what circumstances the necessary
winning points were lost. I was not mistaken.
3. One example was brought out in a speech. Senior Lieutenants
I. Dubov and S. Kolomnikov command batteries in the missile/
gunnery department of the ship. For the former, things are
going well. His subdivision is outstanding and has a reputa-
tion for great naval know-how. Conversely, the latter of
officer's service has not always been successful. In compe-
tition with near neighbours his anti-aircraft battery lagged
behind for a long time even though the "gunners" in this
battery yielded nothing in combat mastery to Dubov' s subordi-
nates. They know very well how to destroy targets in the
air and yet non-the-less the battery didn't show up against
the other outstanding subdivisions. So what was the matter?
4. The speaker, this ship's organization secretary, senior
Lieutenant V. Firsov, tried to answer this question. He drew
attention to one particular detail. It has today become a
rule that every sailor persistently struggles to decrease
the time taken to accomplish combat norms. In this field of
10

crew training the CO. and party organization of the
"Storozhevoy" were interested not in minutes but in seconds,
in as much as these affected the crew's combat readiness.
But had the communists of the ship, and particularly those
in the AA battery, always paid such great attention to another
facet of the competition the moral ethical one? But the
speaker and others xvho spoke at the meeting, such as communists
V. Sablin, M. Sazhin, V. Potulny, analyzing the training
results, were unable to give a positive answer. It appeared
that this factor frequently remained unconsidered in even
the outstanding collectives.
5. In an interval, I was told of the following episode. A
sailor once returned from the guard-room. He had only taken
a couple of steps along the deck when he hears: "Hey fellows
Petrov's come back home". And a minute later the "fellows"
were hugging this man, who had broken discipline. And do you
know who you could see among them. Outstanding sailors,
class-rated specialists; ie. men esteemed in the collective.
They know how to attain complex norms and carry out (print
not legible)
. Everybody can see this and values their worth.
But the fact that these same comrades have fallen down on the
ethical front and have taken up a liberal position in the
fight for purity of heart frequently can be laid at the door
of the "cadre".
6. It is true that the sailor who slipped behind in his
service should have had the attention of the collective. But
how? Clapping him on the shoulder doesn't help. He was
returning from being under arrest. And, having arrived on
deck, he should have said to his colleagues "Comrades, I
stand guilty before you. But I ask you to trust..." And then
to show by diligent service that he was not trusted in vain.
But if the (battery) commander and communists didn't create
such circumstances in the battery, then even the strictest
rebuke loses half its force.
7. Public statement of one's attitude to a comrade's behaviour
is the starting point for creating a climate of opinion x>?hich
will support a man's good name and preserve him from mistaken
actions. Just such a micro-climate has been created in commu-
nist Dubov's battery. Here if a sailor has serious pretentions
he will certainly be made to feel the sharp indignation and
genuine irreconciliability of his colleagues, their interest
in his redirection, and in the final instance in improving
affairs in the collective as a whole.
8. In this same AA battery, as communists noted in their
speeches, the required atmosphere was not immediately created.
One can understand Kolomnikov's difficulties. He is a young
officer to be in command of the battery. He doesn't have
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great instructional experience. This is understandable too;
instructors experience doesn't come in one day. Therefore
the young officer needs help. But before he was given it,
Kolomnikov managed to make a mistake and this naturally
reflected negatively on the crew's final results in the
competition.
9. A year of strenuous training has passed. One more page
in the biography of the party organization of the "Storozhevoy"
has been turned over. Every line of it tells of the deeds in
which the communists were closely involved. The majority of
them played an active role in the life of the crew. I
remember the words of communist N. Sazhin spoken at the meeting
"If you are a party member when it i«; a good thing to start
off each working day by bothering about people. One should
feel required to go to people and actively support all that
is new and first-rate in the service and training, and battle
decisively against the outdated opinions and left-overs from
the past which are in the minds of some comrades". That is,
one shouldn't have a passive attitude in the process of
education and training, but strenuously affirm in comrades
the communist attitude to work and high moral relationships
with each other. Thus is one of the party's important require-
ments, laid down in the decrees of the Central Committee of
the CPSU "On work in educating the ideological cadres in the
Belorussian Party Organization".
10. With the requirements of this decree in mind the ship's
party organization makes great demands on the communists,
aiming at their being active and spirited in their work. But
what actually happened? One party member couldn't find the
time from one month to another to go to the crew's quarters
to have a talk with the sailors. When somebody reminded him
he just clutched his hand and rushed down to the sailors with
the first arbitrary theme he thought of. Naturally a talk,
born at the rush, doesn't always achieve its object.
11. The speaker, and others taking part in the proceedings,
observed that a communist's authority is directly dependent
on his deeds and on his attitude to service duties. He
should inspire the sailors by personal example to overcome
the difficulties encountered on long cruises. He has one
privilege above all to be in front. To be first is more
difficult, but it will be easier for those behind him. On
the "Storozhevoy" they speak with esteem of Engineer Captain
Lieutenant A. Ivanov. This communist takes an active part
in party political work. He often gives lectures, carries
on conversations and leads a political study group \>/hich is,
incidentally, the best in the ship. This party fighter is
always to be found wherever the sailors' communists outlook
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is being formulated. It is praiseworthy that the party-
organization studied the experience of Ivanov on the ideo-
logical front and acquainted the crew with it.
12. But is this style of work inherent to Ivanov alone?
Certainly not. "Storozhevoy ' s" party organization is
sufficiently strong that its communists for the most part
love, and are good at, carrying out educative work in the
collective.
13. In the ship there are now more outstanding men and class-
rated anti-submariners. The crew has sailed thousands of
miles over the world's oceans. These and other meritorious
facts were announced at the meeting. Behind them are a vast
amount of work and indefatigable people with the party card
at their hearts. At their election meeting, they talked of
many things, understood much, saw clearly what they had
achieved as well as their omissions. They observed, for
example, that it was necessary for the party organization
secretary to bring the problems of educating the sailors
before the tribunal of the party collective more frequently
and more often meet and consult the party and Komosomel
"aktivs". There is, in a word, much to take into account
and lessons to be learned.
14. Directly after the meeting the communists stepped forward
to meet the tasks of the new training year. I want to say














































Comparison o£ Soviet and U.S. Naval Grades and Ranks
Officer Grades
Rank* Approximate U.S. Equivalent
Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union
























Warrant Officer (Michman) Chief Warrant Officer
Warrant Officer
MOM-COJCITSSIONED RANKS
Chief Ship's Petty Officer
Chief Petty Officer
Petty Officer First Class
Master Chief Petty Officer
Senior Chief Petty Officer
Chief Petty Officer




Petty Officer Second Class
Petty Officer Third Class
Senior Seaman
Seaman
Petty Officer Second Class
Petty Officer Third Class
Seaman
Seaman Apprentice/Recruit
*Naval aviation, naval infantry, and coastal defense personnel,
although an integral part of the Navy, have "military" ranks,




Morskoy Sbornik Content Analysis
[Articles dealing with disciuline , morale or political
indoctrination)
I . Before Mutiny II. After Mutiny













Total 43/375 = 11.5"^
*Issue Number 1, 1976 not included in analysis due to high
number of articles (8/35) because of the Communist Party
Congress beginning the next month. In addition it is
difficult to determine if this issue went to press before
or after the mutiny.
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